It was Ilocos Norte Governor Matthew Manotoc, nephew of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. who revealed it.
In a July 6, 2022 press conference in Laoag City, the son of Sen. Imee Marcos announced that the Department of Agriculture (DA), headed by his uncle, the President, had approved the release of P100 million to revive a tomato processing plant in his province. He said that tomato growers who supply their products to Northern Foods Corporation (NFC) could resume planting as soon as the new management took over.
“We have the P100 million from DA for our tomato processing plant. And then sana ma-reactivate na rin ‘yung NFC, na nandun pa. Yeah, privatized na po,” he was quoted as saying in a report of the Philippine News Agency (PNA) the following day with the headline “DA to revive tomato processing plant in Ilocos Norte.
“We’re looking for an investor there,” Manotoc said,
The move reversed Memorandum Order No. 58 of former president Rodrigo Duterte abolishing the NFC on December 1, 2021 for “incurring annual net losses, except in the years 1989, 1995, and 2010.” The Memorandum called for the “liquidation of assets and settlement of liabilities” of the NFC.
The government-run PNA made no mention of the role played by President Marcos, who has been in power for barely two weeks, in the founding years of the NFC.
On March 21, 1984, then Ilocos Norte governor Marcos, sent a memorandum to his mother, Imelda, who was minister of human settlements. The document contained a detailed proposal for the founding of a “food and vegetable processing plant and hybrid seed production” in his province, which would become the NFC. The company was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 16, 1984, just five days before Marcos Jr. wrote to the First Lady.
The same memo was sent to Marcos’ father, the country’s president, a day later, on March 22, 1984, asking for immediate approval and the release of funds for the project.
Based on the document, the idea for the project was not entirely that of the presidential son who attributed it to Agriman Consultants, “an agribusiness firm with several joint venture activities with the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS)and Philippine Packing Corporation (Del Monte).”
Marcos Jr. wrote that “upon the request and encouragement of the Provincial Government, [Agriman Consultants] set up an experimental tomato hybrid project in Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. The project was adjudged a success by Del Monte.”
“In view of the favorable results,” the memo went on, “Agriman is now proposing to undertake an integrated food and vegetable production and processing project in the province similar to the PPC/Del Monte Bukidnon facility.”
The son told Imelda that aside from the income, the project would also generate “new jobs and business opportunities.”
“Being the first large scale processing on industrial facility in Ilocos Norte and Northwestern Luzon, it is a concrete manifestation of the wisdom of the President’s and the First Lady’s program of industrial dispersal and rural mobilization,” Marcos Jr. pointed out, adding that it would be “a prestige project of the Governor and the President.”
According to his estimate, the project’s total cost would be P110 million, with financing from a combination of public funds, private loans and investments as detailed in the memorandum:
Sources
Amount (in P million)
Commercial bank loans for inventory financing (commitments from City Trust and other banks have been secured)
30
KKK-PCA investment in preferred shares in Northern Foods Corporation (the venture corporation) bearing 12% annual dividend
69
KKK-PCA investment in common shares
0.49
Private group investment in common shares
0.51
Sub-Total
100
Plus KKK production loans
10
Executive Order No. 715, signed by Marcos Sr. on August 6, 1981, recognized the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) “as a nationwide movement to mobilize such local resources for the establishment of viable productive enterprises that would provide sources of livelihood within the community, and thus make social justice a real part of day-to-day life.” As such, KKK was declared “a government priority program.”
Marcos Sr. headed KKK’s governing body, but made the MHS under his wife its secretariat and implementing agency.
The KKK-Processing Center Authority (PCA) was formed by virtue of Marcos Sr.’s Executive Order No. 866, signed January 11, 1983. The PCA was intended to be KKK’s corporate implementing agency tasked foremost to form, finance, and coordinate regional agro-industrial processing areas. Again, Marcos appointed Imelda to head PCA’s governing body as MHS minister.
KKK-PCA was supposed to have P1 billion as capitalization with an initial operating budget of P300 million drawn from the Treasury when it was formed in 1983 after which its budget was included in the General Appropriations Act.
In his 2014 biography of Cesar Virata, Marcos Sr.’s prime minister, Gerardo P. Sicat, the chief economic planning officer, wrote that the MHS “began dipping into almost every type of program imaginable, creating high-profile action programs for the First Lady to associate herself with.”
“Soon,” he continued, “the ministry was conducting a housing program, then a livelihood and educational training program, all absorbing new funds coming from other units of the government.”
Sicat stated the obvious when he wrote that Imelda’s clout and that of the MHS rested on her influence on her powerful husband.
“Thus, she had the advantage of getting whatever she wanted, as long as the president would agree to it. While the other ministers had to see him in office, write memos, or plea for their case, Mrs. Marcos could see the president at any time, in whatever situation within the household (which was Malacañang),” he explained.
Marcos Jr., on the other hand, sent out memos to his mother and father. On June 11, 1984, the son asked the president for “an additional equity infusion of P50 million and a loan of P10 million at favorable interest rates” to make the NFC viable and operational by December of that year.
Marcos Jr. made no mention of the financing which was supposed to be drawn from the private sector, except that of Agriman Consultants, that he indicated in his approved proposal to Imelda just three months earlier.
The request was in addition to the P36 million that KKK-PCA allocated as initial equity investment and a P34 million “expected loan,” which was thought to be sufficient to put up and run the NFC.
But by June, Marcos Jr. said the P70 million was inadequate given “recent developments specially the high cost of money” and NFC was in “imminent danger that . . . may not be undertaken at all.”
He told his father that NFC’s “successful implementation will definitely be a legacy which our province mates will long remember and cherish.”
On June 28, 1984, the father indulged his son and issued a memorandum instructing his wife “to allocate the amount of P60 million from the KKK-PCA or any of the subsidiaries of the Ministry as an additional equity investment” in NFC.
P130 million of public funds were then committed to the NFC.
On July 23, 1984, Marcos Jr. as governor of Ilocos Norte, leased to the NFC for 25 years some 4.3 hectares of land in San Joaquin, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. NFC’s tomato processing plant was up and running on the land by October 1984.
Rafael C. Ignacio, in a chapter on Social Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development (Asian Institute of Management, 1994), mentioned that Marcos Sr. was present at the inauguration along with United States ambassador Stephen Bosworth.
Also present were top executives of Agriman Consultants: “Mr. Alejandro [Sandy] V. Daza, president; John P. Perrine, executive vice president; and, Atty. Manuel S. Tayag, vice president. Mr. Daza was one of the closest friends and associates of Governor Marcos. Mr. Perrine was the son of an American top executive of Philippine Packing Corporation-Del Monte (PPC-Del Monte).”
Agriman Consultants bagged the contract to manage the NFC. Governor Marcos Jr. had seat at the table as one of the seven members of the company’s board of directors. The original investment package for the NFC reserved 1% of the Class C-Common Shares for the governor, hence the lone C seat. He The governor of the province remained a member of the NFC board until its closure last December.
It seemed all was set for a great agribusiness venture in Ilocos Norte.
But three years after operations began, “there were a number of employees scrounging around the plant premises for pieces of junk copper wires and other scrap metals. They were to sell whatever they found to the scrap traders in Laoag City to generate some cash to pay a part of their salary while their top people were coming and going in chartered planes,” according to Ignacio, quoting Mike Regino, NFC finance manager in the late ‘80s.
The losses were such that, according to Ignacio, “despite the superior technology and a noticeable increase in farmers’ participation, Northern Foods Corporation, however, remained in the red throughout the Agriman era. As of May 31, 1986, NFC’s equity base had shrunk to a level of P69.987 million from an initial amount of P104.545 million.”
Esteban N. Pagaran, in a chapter he wrote in Ground Level Development: NGOs, Co-operatives and Local Organizations in the Third World published (Lund University, 1994) made a negative appraisal of Agriman’s role in the NFC’s founding years. He wrote of how “anomalies committed by the private management firm and the high overhead expenses” resulted in “heavy company losses.”
When a new management took over NFC after the 1986 Edsa revolt, they discovered a “six-figure cash advance made by Agriman.”
Expenses relative to the Management services it Provided NFC from May 1984 to July 31, 1987.
P2,443,761.69
In the last three annual audit on the NFC (2019-2021), and maybe even in much earlier ones, COA stated that since the amount Agriman owed NFC has been “outstanding and non-moving for more than 10 years,” it was now considered part of “Dormant Receivable Accounts.”
In its 2019 Annual Audit Report on the Northern Foods Corporation, COA advised the NFC that they could just write it off or “exert exhaustive efforts to locate original documents pertaining to the transactions” and “exert extra efforts to collect from Agriman Consulting Services.”
COA reiterated its previous recommendation that NFC should just make a formal request to write off the said amount as provided for by COA Circular 2016-005.
In 2000, NFC became part of the DA until Duterte shut it down.
A year later, COA noted in its annual audit of NFC that their previous recommendation on the matter involving Agriman was not implemented since “management was not able to request the write-off of accounts because only photocopies are available and the original documents cannot be located.”
But now, it seems the Marcoses are not done yet with NFC. It is unclear when President Marcos reversed Duterte’s Memo No. 58 and approved the P100 million funding to revive NFC. But with the support of his powerful uncle, the reelected governor of Ilocos Norte is a winner twice over.
There are at least seven false claims, misrepresentations or elements requiring context in Bongbong Marcos’s latest vlog, BBM Vlog 148, titled “Bringing Back Transparency to the Election System” posted after the Supreme Court (SC), sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), dismissed Marcos’ protest of Vice President Leni Robredo’s victory last Feb. 16.
Contentwise, Marcos’s Vlog 148 it is a revised version of his Vlog 145, “Hybrid Election System for 2022,” which was uploaded on January 30, 2021. The “new” entry adds a title card, portions—largely from trailers, it seems—of the 2020 HBO documentary Kill Chain: The Cyber War on America’s Elections, and other additional visuals, such as a list of updates regarding the hybrid election bills filed in Congress. Marcos did not record new material for BBM Vlog 148.
These are the vlog’s false claims or misleading contents:
1. The vlog’s title card states that the Tribunal’s announcement on February 16 concerned only “the dismissal of the recount,” not Marcos’s third cause of action (the annulment of votes due to alleged fraud in three provinces in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, or BARMM). This claim—initially made by Marcos’s lawyer Vic Rodriguez, in a statement dated February 16, 2021 and released via social media—has been debunked numerous times over the last few days by the SC spokesperson Brian Hosaka (by stating in a press briefer that the “entire electoral protest” of Marcos had been junked), Chief Justice Diosdado Peralta, and independent fact-checkers.
2. Marcos says, “sa 227 na bansa sa mundo na nagkakaeleksyon, 209 ang gumagamit ng manual voting” (in 227 countries in the world where elections are held, 209 use manual voting). This is different from what appears in the animated text accompanying Marcos’s narration: “209 out of 227 countries still use paper ballots.”
Based on the likely sources of these numbers, the latter is the factual statement. The vlog does not disclose the source for these seemingly similar but significantly different statements, but they were most likely quoting an October 30, 2020 article uploaded on the Pew Research Center website titled “From Voter Registration to Mail-in Ballots, How Do Countries Around the World Run Their Elections?” There, one will find this sentence: “Votes are cast by manually marking ballots in 209 of the 227 countries and territories for which the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network has data.” A link is provided in the article to the website of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (https://aceproject.org/), where one can generate the following map showing the 209 countries that manually mark ballots:
Unlike what Marcos is insinuating, the Philippines is in fact clearly among the 209 countries that still mark ballots manually, as opposed to using online or e-voting or direct recording electronic voting machines. The Philippines does not use “completely/purely electronic voting,” a phrase that Marcos repeatedly uses in his vlog.
3. Marcos’s vlog suggests that “manual voting” excludes voting that uses paper ballots but counts votes electronically, i.e., the system currently used in the Philippines. Again, the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (https://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDCountry?country=PH) describes the Philippines as a country wherein voters manually mark ballots and use electronic voting machines.
4. To further bolster his partial de-automation advocacy, in the vlog, Marcos claims that some countries are discarding automation, returning to manual processes. This is true. However, among the accompanying news articles that the vlog shows while Marcos is talking, only one, “Fearful of Hacking, Dutch will Count Ballots by Hand” published by the New York Times recalls the Philippine case. The rest are about online or direct electronic entry elections.
Marcos quotes from an article regarding elections in Finland, stating that it is about “completely electronic elections.” “Sabi nila yung risks ay masyadong malaki para sa benefits” (They say that the risks far outweigh the benefits), Marcos says. However, the article is about a very particular form of automated elections: online voting. Even the highlighted text from the article—titled “Security Fears Delay Roll-out of National E-voting in Finland,” which first appeared on Computer Weekly—that Marcos is supposedly quoting from only talks about online voting: “‘Our present position is that online voting should not be introduced in general elections as the risks are greater than the benefits,’ said [Johanna] Suurpää [chair of the e-voting working group of Finland’s Ministry of Justice].”
The Philippines has never utilized any form of direct electronic vote entry or online voting for national or local elections.
5. Marcos says, “Nung 2013 ay nasa 76% lamang ang boto na natransmit o nabilang” (in 2013, only 76% of the votes were transmitted or counted). Again, this does not tie up completely with the text being flashed on screen: “[in 2013,] only 76% of the votes were transmitted.” By adding the word “nabilang,” Marcos is stating that votes that were not transmitted were not counted at all, effectively disenfranchising (hundreds of) thousands of voters. However, according to former Smartmatic lawyer (later two-time Duterte appointee) Karen Jimeno and the Comelec, votes that are not transmitted are still counted because the SD cards where the votes are recorded will be physically delivered to canvassing centers. The Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CENPEG) confirms that these contingency measures have indeed been in place since the first automated elections in the Philippines in 2010, though it noted that there were cases wherein such physical transportation lacked security measures.
Marcos also highlighted the 961 defective vote-counting machines and 1,000 SD cards that needed replacement during the 2019 elections. He did not mention what was widely reported: the defective machines were also replaced.
6. After discussing the glitches in other automated elections in the Philippines, Marcos says, “At naman nung 2016 ay siguro alam na natin ang nangyari” (And then in 2016 we suppose we know what happened), implying that he was a victim of the flaws of and fraud in the election system. In BBM Vlog 145, he said this without any related visuals.
In Vlog 148, this statement is followed by a quick flash of a claim posted on Facebook showing two partial and unofficial results purportedly of a barangay in BARMM where Leni Robredo was the only vice presidential candidate to receive votes, followed by brief flashes of what seem to be photographs of the wet/damaged ballots and ballot boxes that were found when the ballots in the three provinces identified by Marcos were undergoing revision.
Regarding the Facebook post, besides the pictures showing only partial and unofficial results, it is not proven how getting zero votes in a barangay is an indication of fraud. A Rappler article dated May 17, 2016 pointed out that based on partial unofficial results, there were more zero-Robredo vote precincts than zero-Marcos vote precincts, and Marcos “got more votes from precincts that gave Robredo zero votes.” Considering the 2019 senatorial election results, which have not been formally contested, it is also not unimaginable that in several areas in Mindanao, members of the Marcos family are unpopular among voters. Among the three provinces that are contemplated in Marcos’s third cause of action, based on the partial and unofficial results of the 2019 elections, Imee Marcos entered the “magic 12” in only one: Basilan. In Maguindanao, Imee placed 13th, and in Lanao Del Sur, she placed 17th.
Regarding the wet ballots, on pages 42-43 of the October 15, 2019 resolution of the PET on Marcos’s protest, one will find the following: “In the course of the revision [of ballots], the Tribunal observed that the paper ballots in several clustered precincts were wet and unreadable, or their integrity was compromised such that it rendered revision using paper ballots impossible. For these clustered precincts, the Tribunal directed the use of the decrypted ballot images provided by the COMELEC for purposes of revision. The parties registered their claims and objections thereto.” The PET then found that there were no decrypted ballot images for three clustered precincts, and thus excluded them from the revision. However, when added up, the total votes in these precincts were only 910 votes.When the revision was completed—disregarding the wet ballots issue when decrypted ballot images were available—according to the PET, the lead of Robredo over Marcos increased from 263,473 to 278,566 votes.
7. Finally, in the first minute of the video, Marcos says, “Ang sinasabi, yung manual counting ay masyado raw matatagalan. Hindi po totoo ‘yan. Hindi po ito mas matagal kaysa purely electronic na voting” (They say that manual counting takes too long. That’s not true. It’s not true that it takes longer than that in purely electronic voting). Later on, Marcos claims that the manual counting of the votes in a (clustered) precinct, or about 600-800 votes, may be done within 1-2 hours.
This is impossible; in a ballot during a presidential election year, one will have to vote for a president, a vice president, twelve senators, a district congressional representative, a partylist, and local government positions (e.g., governor and vice governor and/or mayor and vice mayor and provincial board members and/or municipal/city council members). During midterm elections, the only positions absent from the ballots are president and vice president. Reading and manually recording the votes in one ballot and verifying if the ballot was appreciated correctly, to the satisfaction of all precinct poll watchers, will obviously take much longer than a few seconds (800 ballots counted in two hours means around 6-7 ballots counted per minute).
Moreover, according to a 2004 document titled “CEPPS Philippines Election Observation Program – Strengthening the Electoral Process” by Peter Erben, Beverly Hagerdon Thakur, Craig Jenness, and Ian Smith of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, available at the ACE Project website, before automation, “an average of 20 votes were counted per hour with each precinct counting approximately 200 ballots.”
Marcos—or his vlog’s scriptwriters—may have misunderstood what hybrid election system advocate Gus Lagman said regarding his projected timeframes. Lagman, in an article dated March 13, 2013, titled “Does Smartmatic’s PCOS Add Value or Problems to our Elections?” posted at The Movement for Good Governance website, “manual precinct counting only takes 5-12 hours.” According to Lagman, it’s the “printing, the visual checking, the re-encoding, and the iteration” of the steps of transmitting PC/laptop encoded election returns—done after counting—that “might take 1-2 hours.” When Lagman’s proposed Patas system was tested in Bacoor, Cavite on June 27, 2015, multiplenews outlets reported that only 20 ballots, covering only the votes for national positions, were counted in 41 minutes.
The system proposed by the Marcos siblings bear similarities to Lagman’s PATAS system. According to then Election Commissioner Christian Robert Lim, as discussed in a Philippine Daily Inquirer article dated July 10, 2015, “Patas’ manual procedure is time-consuming, taxing and prone to human error.”
Perhaps, given all of the above, the eighth misrepresentation in the vlog is Marcos appearing to know what he is talking about.
The vlog strongly suggests that Marcos lost only because of fraud and a flawed system. He notes that the youth are apparently losing interest in elections, claiming that he believes this to be largely due to the defective election system. For visual support, the vlog flashes an article titled “Philippine Youth Losing Faith in Political System.”
The article, posted in the Deutsche Welle website, in fact highlights youth being disheartened by the loss of opposition senatorial candidates in 2019 to candidates such as “a former dictator’s daughter,” i.e., Imee Marcos. Another accompanying visual is a screenshot of the results of a survey which asked one multiple choice question: “Bakit hindi ka pa nagpaparehistro?” The majority in this survey indeed answered “Walang Tiwala Sa Sistema” (No trust in the system). But despite bearing what looks like an infographic with the Comelec logo, it does not appear to have any connection to the election agency. The full survey results, which can be viewed here, indicates that the survey was conducted online between February 6 and February 12, and had only 626 respondents, and restricted responses to three: besides “Walang Tiwala sa Sistema,” one could answer with “Covid, Takot Pa Lumabas” (Covid, scared of going outside) or “Hindi Ko Alam Paano” (I don’t know how [to register]). But the mismatched visual and the clearly unscientific survey may be excused in this instance, since Marcos couched his claims about the youth losing enthusiasm in elections as opinion rather than fact—something Marcos should have done for several other claims in his vlog.
When journalists first heard about the Bongbong rockets in March 1972, they thought it was just another government scam. As retold by the journalist Lee Lescaze, then President Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s press secretary Francisco “Kit” Tatad made this announcement to the Malacañang press corps:
We have launched successfully our first rocket.”
“What is it this time?” a newsman asked. “We have had many rackets before.”
“It is not a racket but a rocket.” Tatad said.
Fifty-two years later, a new racket on the rocket is on the rise again.
Continuing territorial tensions with China have spurred the re-circulation of claims about the rocket development program under Marcos Sr. Encountering material on the Bongbong rockets is not that difficult. Besides the usual pro-Marcos YouTube videos (including this, uploaded on May 30, 2024, with over 23,000 views as of this writing), Marcos supporter tweets, and videos sharing Senator Imee Marcos’s half-truths about her father’s Self-Reliance Defense Posture (SRDP) program (such as this, uploaded in June 3, and shared over 560 times), one can find a recently opened permanent exhibit extolling the Bongbong rocket program, which is much more accessible than the rocket on display at the Philippine Navy Museum in Cavite.
On January 30, 2024, the 4th Marine “Makusug” Brigade inaugurated the Military Park in Camp Cape Bojeador in Burgos, Ilocos Norte. A Daily Tribune article noted that by March 7, 2024, the “military tourism” park had already received over 21,000 visitors. A May 6, 2024 ABS-CBN Facebook post showed that the attraction continued to be well-patronized. Located near the national highway, one can pass by the Military Park on the way up to visit other popular tourist destinations: the Cape Bojeador Lighthouse, the Burgos and Bangui Windmills, and the Patapat Viaduct. It is already in the itineraries of several Ilocos Norte tour organizers.
Pictures of the Inauguration of the Military Park in Camp Cape Bojeador, Burgos Ilocos Norte, from the Facebook page of the 4th Marine Brigade.
Based on the Facebook posts of some of the park visitors, one of the exhibits there is a replica of a Bongbong rocket launch vehicle. Part of the exhibitdescription reads:
This exhibit showcases a replica of a rocket integral to the Philippine military’s venture into developing its ballistic missiles. The initiative unfolded through the collaborative efforts of Filipino and German engineers and scientists, in partnership with the Philippine Navy under Project Santa Barbara of the Self-Reliance Defense Posture (SRDP) program in the 1970s. The rocket earned its moniker, “Bongbong Rocket” in honor of the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos’ son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos Jr, the 17th President of the Republic of the Philippines . . . Despite the promising advancements, the project was discontinued totally in 1986. Nevertheless, the innovative spirit that fueled this endeavor lives on. And the project’s enduring legacy stands as a testament to its positive impact on the Philippine military’s capability for technological advancements and scientific explorations.
Why project was named Sta. Barbara
The text calls the first launch “successful” and “triumphant.” SRDP proponents like Imee and Senator Bato de la Rosa say pretty much the same thing. Many have already attemptedto explain—briefly, in fact-check format—how the country’s homegrown missile program was hardly the first within the region or was a resounding success. Most online articles state that the missile program was codenamed “Project Sta. Barbara”—patron saint of artillerymen.
Launch tests were conducted in the 1970s; and the program, for unclear reasons, was discontinued. Some writers simply state that the discontinuance was a mystery or that the project’s details remain classified. Sources partial to the Marcoses claim or allude, like the Burgos exhibit text, that the project only ended after the fall of the Marcos regime in February 1986.
Bob Couttie, a historian, wrote a detailed description of the project, using declassified US Department of State cables among his primary sources. His blog post “Marcos’s Roman Candle Superweapons,” a version of which also appears as a chapter in his last book Fool’s Gold, largely tackles the entirely false claim that the Marcos regime successfully developed “anti-typhoon” rockets, before detailing why Project Sta. Barbara never produced what could be legitimately referred to as “ballistic missiles”: lack of funding, as well as the absence of support from the country’s eternal ally, the United States. But Couttie was unable to fill in a number of blanks regarding the rocket program using his sources: Who were the scientists involved? How many tests have extant documentation? How far in terms of technological advancement did the program reach? Did it really end because of Cory Aquino?
Most of these can now be better answered using recently accessible primary sources, some of which were marked “classified” or “secret” decades ago.
The president’s rocket men
If his February 13, 1971 diary entry were to be believed, Marcos Sr. was not even keen on having a missile system. The Israelis were hawking their Gabriel weapons system then. Marcos Sr. was thinking of something else.
“Saw the Israeli film on the demonstration of their Gabriel weapons system . . . what we really need is not a missile system for the Navy but airfields for our jet fighters in Zamboanga, Davao, Cagayan de Oro and Laoag and Legaspi in Luzon. Our fighters are now armed with missiles,” Bongbong’s father said.
Nine months later, he changed his mind. Marcos-supported rocket research appears to have started on November 21, 1971. On that date, Marcos met with a foreign physicist, Dr. Max Goldberger, to discuss the latter’s proposal for “catalytic research.” Also in attendance were National Science Development Board (NSDB) chairman Florencio A. Medina, a retired brigadier general of the Philippine Army. According to a confidential report written by Medina, transmitted to Marcos on December 4, 1971, further discussions with Goldberger were held with other government officials, including other persons from the NSDB and Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor. It was Melchor, a US Naval Academy graduate, who suggested that a “production laboratory” for the implementation of Dr. Goldberger’s proposal could be set up in “one of the vacant hangars at Sangley Point,” while the “machine shops of the Philippine Navy at Cavite City” could be one of the “supporting facilities for tooling.” Goldberger found these facilities to be adequate.
By the time Goldberger first met Marcos, he was listed as an inventor in a number of patents or patentapplications assigned to Pioneer Research, Inc.” A news article in the February 1970 issue of the Manchester [Connecticut] Evening Herald describes Goldberger as the director of research and company vice president of Pioneer, which had developed a 100-watt commercial model of a hydrazine fuel cell. Goldberger also made the news in the 1960s for his propulsion experiments. One news article, from the Associated Press, talks about a November 1965 attempt by Goldberger to launch a rocket in Long Island, Connecticut. Goldberger and his team initially thought there was an “ignition failure,” but as they were packing up, “someone accidentally tripped the faulty ignition and the rocket shot 500 feet up,” which made Goldberger say that the “rocket’s performance…was a ‘ballistic success.’”
In the cover letter of his December 1971 report, Medina recommended pushing through with Goldberger’s proposal, committing the NSDB to collaborate closely with the foreign scientist. Medina said that the proposed program “is a laudible [sic] undertaking as it will introduce into the country at very minimal cost the basic techniques of rocket propulsion and of fuel cells which have paramount impact in both their civilian and military applications.” He stated that the initial expenditure may be USD 10-20 thousand, or PHP 66-132 thousand, or slightly more than 1-2 years of the president’s salary. Medina also emphasized that Goldberger offered his services “free of charge.” Marcos immediately approved the proposal.
Before publicizing their rocket research, the Marcos government first informed the United States of their missile plans. On December 13, 1971, Gen.Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, gave a presentation on “The Attainment of a Self-Reliant Defense Posture” during the 71-12 Mutual Defense Board Meeting at Camp Aguinaldo. Among those in attendance were Marcos, US Ambassador Henry Byroade, foreign affairs secretary Carlos P. Romulo, and US Admiral John S. McCain Jr. In his speech, which gave a “detailed presentation of our plan to attain [a self-reliant defense] posture with the assistance from our allies, particularly the United States,” Yan said,
The importance of an indigenous capability to produce explosives and propellants may not readily be apparent . . . But the other important objective is the development of rockets and missiles . . . In essence, mastery in the production of explosives and propellants is the key to the attainment of a strategic power of deterrence.
In his diary entry for December 14, 1971, Marcos Sr. wrote that he “ordered the rocket research and experiments of Dr. Max Goldberger to be started.” Marcos Sr., also said that he will “fund [the research] with the Intelligence Funds at [his] disposal.” Unverifiable claims would later be made that the rockets were funded with money from the Marcos Foundation, where he falsely claimed to have deposited all of his wealth.
Marcos Sr., in his diary entry for December 28, 1971, mentioned that he had dinner with Goldberger, congressman Antonio Raquiza, and an Alex Rothchild. He noted that Goldberger was “married to an Ilocana niece” of Raquiza, a close Marcos ally, which may account for Goldberger’s initial access to Marcos.
Bongbong rocket lift-offs—and letdowns
The first known rocket launch took place on March 12, 1972. The Burgos exhibit text echoes some of the reportage on that launch, including Melchor’s claim that the Bongbong rocket was built in only twenty-one days. If that is factual, then construction of the rocket would have started in late February 1972, or more than two months after Marcos approved the Medina-endorsed Goldberger proposal. Based on his diaries, Marcos met with Goldberger on February 12, 1972, “for our experiments and research on guided missiles and chemically powered batteries.”
What was launched in March 1972 was called “Bongbong II”; it is unclear what happened to Bongbong I, if there was one. Reports about the launch that were released soon after it took place include one from UPI, which stated that, based on Malacanang sources, “the Philippines has successfully launched its first home-made rocket secretly.” It also stated that Marcos had shown his cabinet “a 30-minute film of the launching from Caballo Island near Corregidor Island at the mouth of Manila Bay and the rocket being retrieved by the Armed Forces in the South China Sea.”
The article by Lee Lescaze on the launch, which quoted Tatad’s exchanges with the press, was well syndicated in US newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times. It was published between August-September 1972—several months after Bongbong II lifted off. The article included numerous details about the launch and Bongbong II itself—purportedly, it cost “only” USD 3,250.00 (about PHP 22,000.00), was eight feet long and six inches in diameter, and was hand-fed into a launcher made from “a piece of pipe found in a junkyard in Manila’s Chinatown.”
Marcos supposedly flew to Caballo to witness the launch, even after he was told that the chance of success was only 60 percent. It did seem that the launch was going to fail; reminiscent of Goldberger’s 1965 test in Connecticut, Lescaze said, “The range officer began his countdown, but at zero, Bong-Bong II remained on the pad. Flustered, he began counting and at ‘two,’ the rocket took off.”
Lescaze’s article quotes Melchor several times; the executive secretary was referred to as the “father of the Philippine rocket program.” Goldberger is not mentioned in the article at all. Interestingly—and not entirely in agreement with accessible primary sources—the article claimed that the project was “the result of a secret crash program by a group of Filipino scientists who had set out to design a windmill and then realized they had a rocket within their grasp.” Toward its conclusion, the article noted that “the missile budget has been cut in half as part of government austerity efforts following July’s disastrous flooding of central Luzon. Tests are continuing at Caballo, however.”
On November 18, 1972, Melchor asked for clearance to launch another liquid-propellant rocket, Bongbong III, on December 2 that year. Besides “maintaining the momentum” of the rocket project, Melchor also hoped that the test would help them explore the “possible rain-making application of the rockets,” i.e., sending up a “vehicle which will carry a payload of silver iodide to a desired altitude,” and to “acquire experience in the use of hydrazine,” “the ultimate in rocket fuel,” and to “get a feel of firing a more sophisticated and bigger rocket.” Melchor noted that “With the present control of government over media”—this was, after all, almost two months after the start of the Marcos dictatorship—”the test can be conducted with the least of fanfare, treating it just like any routine scientific and technological test.”
“Request for Clearance to Conduct Dynamic Test of 180mm Rocket at Caballo Island” from Alejandro Melchor to Ferdinand Marcos Sr., from the digitized PCGG files.
Epic fail
The launch failed spectacularly. Marcos wrote in his diary on December 3, 1972, “Bongbong III (the 180 mm hydrazine fueled rocket) exploded on take off at the test site in Caballo.” The report attached to the diary entry noted that “The explosion scattered the various missile components in the launching pad and buckled and broke open the seams of the heavy steel gate separating the launching pad from mission control.” The report was signed by Commodore Alfredo C. Protacio of the Philippine Navy and E.M. Terrado (“Head, Chemical Grp.”), both of Project Sta. Barbara. Throughout the rest of its existence, Project Sta. Barbara was directly under the Office of the President.
Report, “Dynamic Test of Bongbong III,” from the digitized PCGG files
A June 1, 2024 Facebook post of the Naval Research and Technology Development Center states that their institution was established “in pursuit of fortifying the country’s Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Program, specifically the Project Sta. Barbara” in 1973. An article co-authored by Terrado in the June 1974 issue of the Philippine Journal of Science discusses fuel cell research being done at the Sta. Barbara laboratories. It is thus safe to say that part of Sta. Barbara’s funds, which were not exclusively for rockets, came from the Philippine Navy.
A more successful launch was conducted on December 30, 1972, the hundredth day since the official date of Marcos’s martial law declaration.The day before, Melchor sent a message informing Marcos that he and Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile would be at Caballo for a missile test. After the test, Melchor sent a dispatch to Marcos’s presidential yacht to say that the launch of the “Bongbong 7” was successful, and that he would like the yacht to pass by Caballo so that they can salute the president. Unfortunately, the message was not received on time—the yacht was already at Sangley Point—so no post-launch salute “on the occasion of the one hundredth day anniversary of the New Society and [Marcos’s] seventh year as president” took place.
Further tests were conducted in 1973.Marcos’s May 13, 1973 diary entry states that “Our missile tests have been successful and we have a launcher on a dump truck that can be pivoted on a 360 degree and elevated up to vertical.” Several pictures of the tests conducted the day before were attached. The pictures show the launcher, called “Bukang Liwayway,” which was further labeled “SP [solid propellant] Missile Launcher” and “Missile Defense Command.”
Marcos claimed in his diary entry that the missiles showed up in the radar scopes of the helicopter and planes at the US Air Force base in Clark, Pampanga. A photo in the set shows Marcos with Melchor and Goldberger. It is unclear how many rockets were tested, but the launcher had six barrels.
From left to right: Alejandro Melchor, Max Goldberger, and Ferdinand Marcos Sr. Photo from the digitized PCGG files.
Photos of the May 1973 rocket tests, from the digitized PCGG files.
Neither the December 1972 nor the May 1973 launches are known to have been covered by the international media.What appeared to be the Bukang Liwayway launcher, carrying six Bongbong rockets, was rolled out in the 1973 Independence Day Parade in Luneta, about a month after the May 1973 tests. Instead of Bukang Liwayway, however, the label on the launcher said “WX Modification & Research”—a reference to the program’s weather manipulation aims (WX has been an abbreviation for weather since the morse code/teletype era). Couttie explained that by the early 1970s, researchers in the US—where silver iodide weather modification experiments started in the 1940s—were already very skeptical of the efficacy of dropping or launching chemicals into clouds to weaken hurricanes.
U.S. assessment of Bongbong rocket project: overly expensive, wasteful
A declassified confidential cable from the US Department of State, dated February 6, 1974 concerns an aide memoire from Melchor about a standing request for assistance in the Philippine rocket research program, first made in October 1973. Melchor stated that the program would be a “heavy burden” on the “finances of the [Philippine] economy,” and rocket development thus far had “been met with early technical reverses primarily due to the absence of the much needed logistics support base”; he emphasized that “The critical lack of experience and a working model proved very costly and has drained heavily the meager resources appropriated for [the] endeavor.” Melchor noted that what they wanted to build was a multipurpose rocket, both for defense and for sparing the Philippines from “yearly destructions caused by the extremes of weather.”
The US ambassador, William Sullivan, recommended “modest assistance in technical package with training and advice as well as models,” but no accessible records show that any such assistance was given. US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger believed such assistance would be going down a slippery slope: “We saw no particular problems in giving Melchor ‘exces’ Nikes [Nike-Hercules missile ‘cadavers’] as tinker toys,” but “Our feeling is that any meaningful assistance to the Philippine missile program would be overly expensive, wasteful of Philippine resources and unhelpful to the Philippines or to the USA.” In a July 3, 1974 cable, Sullivan tried to argue to give Melchor his missile cadavers, to no avail.
The next launches that made the news abroad were done in September 1975. Government issuances on the tests were, expectedly, brimming with praise. According to the September 5-11, 1975 “Official Week in Review,” on September 7, Marcos “announced that the Philippines is engaged in an experiment in the local production of ballistic missiles in pursuance to its Self-Reliance Defense Program”; “The defense of the Philippines cannot be left to alliances with other countries,” the President said as he witnessed the successful test-firing of locally produced missiles at the northern coast of Luzon….Dubbed the ‘Bongbong’ rockets, the missiles were fired some 10 to 12 kilometers into the sea from launchers mounted on a military vehicle parked along the shoreline.” A declassified US cable states that, as per Manila (government-controlled) press accounts, the rockets “went ‘roaring two kilometers into the sky.’”
An Associated Press article published in US newspapers, relying solely on Philippine government sources, said that four rockets were launched, and that the tests were witnessed by Ferdinand, Imelda Marcos, and “the couple’s two children”—possibly Irene and Bongbong, who had yet to start his failed pursuit of a bachelor’s degree in Oxford.
Americans, or at least Ambassador Sullivan, were not impressed. In a confidential cable dated September 18, 1975, the man who had overseen a secret massive bombing campaign in Laos said, “This latest launch event suggests that the local state of the art is still not much beyond the Roman candle stage (photos show no evidence of any associated guidance or other electronic gear), and that ‘our own ballistic missile’ is still on the drawing pad.”
Yet even as Marcos and his gang tried to inveigle American aid for a key component of his SRDP, in secret, he appeared to be wasting the country’s scarce foreign reserves—one of the very resources that SRDP was trying not to waste—to indulge his desire for sniper rifles.
Manuel Collantes, then acting secretary of foreign affairs, sent a memo to Marcos on October 17, 1973, that they can by then purchase from West Germany “Mauser-66 .308 sniper rifle with telescopic sight.” Marcos ordered “fifty (50) pieces of said rifle with 12, 500 rounds of ammunition . . . at the proffered cost of Deutschemarks 3,150 apiece.” With that bundle came “one piece of an especially offered auxiliary infrared mounted instruments at the cost of Deutschemarks 12, 470.” A piece fit for a despot or a king.
Secret memorandum from Manuel Collantes to Marcos Sr. on the West German Mauser-66 sniper rifle, from the digitized PCGG files
Bye Bye Sta. Barbara
Andrew L. Ross, in a chapter of the 1984 book Arms Production in Developing Countries, noted that “the Philippines has not developed or produced guided missiles,” but, based on the September 1975 tests, the country “has reportedly designed an artillery rocket.” “Subsequent developments” after the 1975 launches “have not been revealed,” Ross continued. In a footnote, he further added, “AFP Officers were not eager to discuss the Bongbong rocket and little is publicly known about the project.”
Indeed, there were no further reported developments on the rocket program after 1975.
Incidentally, Melchor was replaced as executive secretary in November 1974, and the office of the executive secretary was replaced by various presidential assistants beginning in December 1975. Bongbong (the person) would himself be appointed “Special Assistant to the President” in 1978. In his memoir Endless Journey, Jose T. Almonte claimed that Imelda Marcos distrusted Melchor, alleging that he was “involved in a plot to overthrow” Marcos. Melchor continued to have Marcos’s ear, however, being appointed a board member of the Development Bank of the Philippines and becoming a director of the Asian Development Bank. He had a brief stint as ambassador to Russia under Cory Aquino. He died in 2002.
As for Goldberger, no document has been found showing his continued involvement in the rocket program beyond the mid-1970s. A US Department of State cable, dated October 18, 1974 states that he was the chairman of the board and president of a Metro Manila-based firm called Advanced Technological Products, Inc., which specialized in building and fabricating “amphibian cars” and the distribution, importation, and installation of generators. The cable lists his address as Los Angeles, California. Goldberger later permanently relocated to Hawaii, where he became involved in local alternative energy development projects from the late 1980s onward. He died in 2012.
Numerous declassified United States Department of State cables show attempts by the Philippines to acquire complete missile systems from the US after 1975.According to a July 1976 cable, Enrile sent a letter to Marcos regarding a five-year AFP modernization program, which includes a wish list of defense materiel, including US-manufactured Nike Hercules and Chaparral missile systems, both with “support equipment, follow-on spares, tooling and training package.”
A January 1978 cable shows that the US did not want to give the Philippines access to weapons like the Harpoon ship-to-ship missile “on policy grounds.” In October 1979, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke took a meeting with Enrile and Marcos, discussing the Harpoon. Holbrooke and Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Armacoast tried to dissuade them from pursuing the system, explaining how prohibitively expensive it was (a later cable stated that the system cost USD 50 million). Marcos noted that their neighbors—Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan—had their own missile systems; the US diplomats insisted that the Philippines did not need one. Marcos and Enrile stated that they were also interested in the Israeli-made Gabriel system (the same one that Marcos was not so keen on in 1971), possibly buying it from Singapore, effectively saying they were bent on acquiring a missile system even without US assistance—not that the Philippines could afford one.
All these exchanges indicate that the Philippines did not have a functional missile system in the late 1970s, and that they tried—and failed—to acquire missile systems from abroad.
An Associated Press photograph published in the December 23, 1981 issue of the South China Morning Post is captioned “Marcos checks Bongbong…”;the full description states that the photo showed Marcos inspecting “models of Philippine-made 180-mm rockets named after his son” during Armed Forces Day, December 21. Thus, it appears that facsimiles of the rockets were trotted out during parades even in the 1980s, even if there were no more publicized tests or launches—or likely, any form of rocket research.
Project Sta. Barbara shifts from rocket to alcogas
In fact, by then, Project Sta. Barbara had shifted (back) to focusing on alternative energy sources. Between 1978 and 1982, multiplepatents were granted to Commodore Protacio and other Sta. Barbara members—such as future Department of Information and Communications Technology undersecretary Eliseo Rio—related to alternative energy development, including one for a solar drier and a handful for alcogas-related methods and devices. In his 1979 State of the Nation Address, Marcos mentioned Sta. Barbara’s “alco-tipid” fuel research. An article written by Protacio, published in a 1981 issue of the Philippine Engineering Journal, states that Sta. Barbara’s alko-tipid research started in April 1979. The March 23-March 28, 1981 “Official Week in Review” mentions a charcoal-fed “hydro-gas” jeepney developed by Commodore Protacio, which was never mass produced. Sta. Barbara was also involved in a USAID-funded windmill dispersal program from 1980 to 1983.
None of the known Project Sta. Barbara patents are directly related to rocket or missile development or any other kind of weaponry. None involved fuel cells or hydrazine either.
A coda on Marcosian superweapon development: several months before the last publicized Bongbong tests, on May 24, 1975, MGen. Fabian Ver, then head of the Presidential Security Command, sent a short memorandum to Marcos. He said that a Lt. Col. Certeza (likely Rene Certeza, also of the PSC) introduced him to a certain Seitoko Tamaki, who “offered to deliver to us for use of the AFP a DEATH RAY machine using LASER beams that can kill, burn and destroy any object including tanks, trucks etc in its path to a range of 20 kms.” Marcos attached the memorandum to his May 27, 1975 diary entry, where he said, “I have ordered the matter [the “laser-beam weapon”] to be seriously considered.” Between weather control rockets and death rays, and later on deep-sea deuterium deposits, one wonders whether Marcos Sr. was basing his plans for Philippine development partly on science fiction.
Fabian Ver’s memorandum to Ferdinand Marcos Sr. on a “Death Ray,” from the digitized PCGG files.
The exact date that Project Sta. Barbara was shut down remains unknown. It is safe to say however that government-funded rocket or missile research did not die because of the 1986 EDSA Revolution or because Cory Aquino either abandoned it or shut it down. It died well before that. Marcos does not mention the need to revive the rocket program in his known post-presidency writings.
The Manila Standard reported in July 1990 that thirty-five 500-liter drums of anhydrous hydrazine were hidden “in an underground bunker at Sangley Point airbase in Cavite,” which had “deteriorated to the point that they are in danger of exploding.” The report noted that they were used in “the late President Marcos’ unsuccessful attempt in the 1970s to develop home-grown battlefield rocket capability.” If Sta. Barbara stopped experimenting with hydrazine in the late 1970s, then the drums in Cavite had been lying idle for over a decade at that time.
The dream for the Bongbong rockets ended neither with a whimper or a bang. That’s what the Philippine Marines today call “successful” and “triumphant.”
Senator Imee Marcos, sister of the president, and daughter of the dictator, is known for making false claims or stating outright lies about herself, her family, and their legacy. Lately, she has been calling for a revival of her father’s Self-Reliance Defense Posture (SRDP) program, as if any attempts to have a self-reliant military or one buying from local manufacturers, were discarded after the Marcoses were deposed in 1986. This is not at all true.
Defense self-reliance not a Marcos brainchild
It is true that Imee’s father issued Presidential Decree no. 415 in 1974, “Authorizing the Secretary of National Defense to Enter into Defense Contracts to Implement Projects under the Self-Reliant Defense Programs and for Other Purposes,” which mandated a ₱100 million annual budget for the SRDP Program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
But, as pointed out by a comprehensive (albeit now outdated) study on SRDP by Danilo Lazo and Juania Mercader, published in the Asian Studies journal, “The basic policy governing the self-reliance program can be found in Commonwealth Act No. 138” or the Flag Law, enacted back in 1936, “which requires preference for locally manufactured items in the procurement of supplies even if they cost up to fifteen percent higher than importing the said items.” Furthermore, Lazo and Mercader also note that “As early as 1948, the AFP has embarked into the long path of self-sufficiency especially when the Research and Development Center was organized to study the local manufacture of ammunition.” Self-reliance was not concocted by Marcos Sr. alone.
True as well, there are procurement-related restrictions that hamper support for the local defense industry, necessitating—at least for local contractors and the AFP—a new SRDP law. But this can be called for without resorting, as Imee does, to the old Marcos Golden Age myths. “Nasubukan na natin yan, at kinaya natin,” she said about SRDP during her father’s time in her 2024 Araw ng Kagitingan press release.
“Initiated by her father. . . . Under the program, the Philippines was producing M-16 rifles, hand grenades and various other ammunition, patrol boats, and military jeeps, among others,” her PR bit affirms.
Pushing for her father’s SRDP in Agusan del Sur on May 4 made the Philippine Daily Inquirer dig up a press release her office issued in February 2023, where she says, “In the 70’s to early 80’s, our SRDP was already producing M-16 rifles under license, steel helmets, hand grenades and other ammunition, handheld radios, Jiffy jeeps. It also created jobs and minimized foreign spending.” In the press release, Imee also “explained that Filipino manufacturers used local materials besides the imported parts from which technological know-how was gained, with the National Science Development Board [predecessor of the Department of Science and Technology] supporting research and development.”
More recently, during a May 18, 2024 interview with Zamboanga City radio station Magic 95.5, she said, “noong panahon ng tatay ko, may self-defense, may self-reliant defense posture…But now we virtually have no defense manufacturing at all. Ultimo bala natin imported. ‘Yung mga guns that we used to make are now imported from South Korea…Now it is all imported and we are struggling to rebuild.”
In all these statements, Imee asserts that her father’s SRDP program went without a hitch—we were producing what we needed on our own. The story of the oft-highlighted M16 manufacturing project, however, illustrates some of the Marcos-era issues glossed over by Imee and other SRDP law advocates: perennial funding issues, continued foreign reliance even for raw materials and supplies, cronyism, mismanagement, and misguided attempts at state-led arms exportation.
The Arms and Munitions “Metal-workers” of the ’70s
The Government Arsenal (GA), an agency under the Department of National Defense (DND), was created in 1957, through Republic Act No. 1884. This Garcia-era law states that “The Government hereby declares its policy to achieve within a reasonable time self-sufficiency in small arms, mortars, and other weapons, ammunition for these weapons, and other munitions for the use of the military establishments.” Other provisions of the law talk about the establishment of a small arms munitions plant “and all other plants,” as well as an initial appropriation of over ₱ 5.6 million. The next significant event in the GA story is the groundbreaking of the GA’s site in Limay, Bataan. It does not mention attempts in between to secure what eventually became a key source of funding for the Arsenal: Japanese war reparations.
Hilarion Henares Jr. claims that he drew up the plan to fund the Arsenal using reparations back when he headed the National Economic Council under the Macapagal administration. In October 1964, Macapagal publicly announced that reparations were going to be utilized to build a US$3 million munitions plant. Henares (in his book Beast and Beauty) and Macapagal (in his book A Stone for the Edifice) stated that the Japanese government was resistant to funding the plant proposal because doing so may be seen to contradict Japan’s constitutional renunciation of war, but they explained that the plant’s products would only be used for internal peace and security, not defense against external threats. Macapagal personally appealed for the proposal’s approval to Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, who agreed to use reparations to construct a “metal-working plant” for the DND.
Several reparations contracts for “metal working and allied equipment” were executed between Japanese contractors and the Department of National Defense between November 1965—in the last days of the Macapagal administration, shortly after it became clear that Marcos Sr. beat Macapagal in the elections that year—and December 1975. The total value of these contracts exceeds US$ 8.6 million (1 USD = 3.9 ₱ from 1965-1969, 1 US$ = 6-7.2 ₱ from 1970-1975). A memorandum from secretary of defense Juan Ponce Enrile to Marcos Sr. dated January 6, 1971, confirms that the GA was heavily reliant on Japanese reparations, not only for equipment (the first of which was delivered in 1968) but also for personnel training.
Enrile, in an article in the 1978 Fookien Times Philippines Yearbook, stated that “the actual integrated manufacturing process [of the Arsenal] started only in the early part of 1974.” Enrile also stated that by 1978, the Arsenal’s plant was also producing 7.62 mm ammunition, “a pet project of the president,” and M16 (M161A) automatic rifles, “with most of its parts locally manufactured in joint venture with local private firms.” The 1981 propaganda book The Marcos Years: Achievements Under the New Society described the Philippines’s in-country M16 production capability as a highlight of the SRDP Program: “M-16 rifle is now assembled within the Government Arsenal site in Bataan, with all the rifle parts manufactured by local firms.”
Illustration accompanying an article on the GA M-16 manufacturing project, from October 2011 issue of the G.A. Bullet-in
Armscor and Elitool
Two firms prominently associated with arms manufacturing for the AFP are the Arms Corporation of the Philippines (Armscor) and the Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corporation (Elitool). Headquartered in Marikina, Armscor traces its roots to Squires Bingham Manufacturing, Inc., which was established as a firearms manufacturing company in the 1950s. A reorganization led to the creation of Armscor in 1980, with Squires Bingham becoming the former’s parent company. According to a 1986 position paper from Armscor, it sold a total of ₱ 23.8 million in arms and munitions to the AFP between 1981 and 1983 and did not make any sales to the Armed Forces beyond mid-1983. The position paper was submitted to the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in relation to publicized claims that Armscor was part of a ring of suppliers connected to former AFP chief Fabian Ver. Armscor weathered the accusation, continuing to thrive until today, with subsidiaries and customers worldwide; it has never been dependent on local defense contracts for profit.
Elitool was a different story. They were the principal company involved in the production of M16s mentioned by Enrile. But in the early 1970s, unlike Armscor/Squires Bingham, it was not primarily known as an arms manufacturer. It was known for making metal hand tools. The “Eli” in the name comes from the Elizalde Group of Companies. Manuel Elizalde Jr., a Marcos associate, owned the controlling shares of Elitool.
From the start of the M16 manufacturing project, months before Marcos Sr.’s SRDP decree was issued, the main entities involved were the Government Arsenal and Elitool. The Government of the Philippines (GOP) and Colt Industries approved ten-year licensing and transfer of technology agreements for the production of M16s on September 17, 1973, similar to a deal struck with the government of South Korea. According to a declassified US State Department cable dated September 18, 1973, the GOP and Colt agreed to a phased in-country production schedule, wherein the former would initially make direct purchases of several thousand M16s (months 0-9), then assemble the rifles in country, with locally sourced content increasing until year 6 (within 1979-1980) when the rifles will be produced in the Philippines with 100 percent local content. The cable states that the bolt and barrel manufacturing and final assembly were the GA’s responsibility; Elitool would manufacture everything else, “except those subcontracted out,” in its facilities within Metro Manila.
Just as the Arsenal relied on foreign funding to start making munitions, the rifle project needed foreign funding to get off the ground. The September 18, 1973 cable states that the Secretary of National Defense (headed by Juan Ponce Enrile) requested the US government for “an FMS [Foreign Military Sales] loan to partially finance the rifle plant project. Under the GOP request, the FMS loan would be for $15,614,000, divided into two annual installments [between 1974-75].” The cable also states that the GOP was going to assist Elitool “obtain a peso loan equivalent to approximately US$ 6,380,000” to further finance the project. Based on the transcripts of the US House of Representatives hearings for foreign assistance and related agencies appropriations for 1975, the memorandum of understanding for the FMS credit was signed in May 1974, and the repayment of the credit must be “in the form of principal and interest charges.”
Another agreement, specifically between the GOP (represented by Vicente Paterno, then chair of the Board of Investments) and Elitool, executed in October 1973, stated that the former would supply imported raw materials and production supplies to the latter. The original GOP-Elitool agreement also stated that the government would construct facilities in Fort Bonifacio (for bolt and barrel production) and in the GA complex in Bataan (for final assembly) at no cost to Elitool, who will supervise the construction of these facilities. The government would shoulder over ₱ 160 million in costs; Elitool would shoulder at least ₱ 42 million. Both, again, would rely on loans.
The expensive project involving the two “metal workers” yielded results. By April 1981, the GA and Elitool had delivered nearly 158,000 M16s out of an order of 172,500 units (150,000 rifles and 22,500 equivalent spares) though the project continued to rely on some imported materials/supplies obtained through Colt, as a “purchasing agent,” by the AFP. In April of that year, shortly before the agreement between the GOP and Elitool was set to expire, an amendment to the total order was made; Elitool was tasked to manufacture another 60,000 rifles, using SRDP funds, costing a total of ₱ 130 million.
Arms-dealing ambitions
What principally brought about the increase was a plan to export M16s to neighboring countries such as Indonesia and Thailand. General Romeo Espino, AFP chief, in his January 1981 proposal to Enrile to extend Elitool’s contract and amend its deliverables, stated that they could at the time undercut Colt itself by US$85 per rifle and make deliveries immediately, tapping into existing stock (ex-stock) manufactured by Elitool.
A total of ₱ 130,000,000 in SRDP funds was to be tapped for the extension-exportation scheme. With the approval by Marcos Sr., a deal was struck between the AFP and Elitool in November 1981: the former lent (or effectively “returned”) an initial 20,000 rifles to the latter for exportation, with the condition that Elitool will replenish the “borrowed” rifles with proceeds from overseas sales. It seemed like a win-win, as the rifle project was proving to be financially burdensome by that time, and the deal would ideally result in more rifles for the AFP and the sustainability of GA-Elitool’s firearm-manufacturing capability.
If the value of SRPD exports was any indication, the Philippines was hardly on its way to becoming a well-patronized defense materiel manufacturer in the early 1980s. In an article in the 1983-1984 edition of the Fookien Times Yearbook, AFP chief of staff Gen. Fabian Ver said that by November 1983, SRDP exports—including tactical radios, practice bombs, and small arms and ammunition—had earned a total of less than USD 8 million since 1974 (1 US$ = 11.11 ₱ in 1983).
Exportation, however, was not readily permitted by the existing agreements with Colt and the United States government. Department of State cables show that the US was supportive of the project as a means of helping the Philippines develop self-reliance, resulting in foreign exchange savings to the Philippines and potentially strengthening local support for the retention of US bases. But cables also show that the US government did not want the Marcos government to sell rifles received under the production program without the former’s consent, while the final agreements with Colt specified that the products of their licensee could not be sold to other countries. According to James Everett Katz, in the 1984 book Arms Production in Developing Countries, “Although Colt had agreed in the September 1973 agreement to the production of an additional 65,000 M-16s for export, the U.S. government insisted in the May 1974 agreement that the provision be dropped.”
Katz further details failed attempts to work out an exportation deal: “[In early 1981,] Colt was willing to allow the Philippines to export 65,000 M-16s, but it also imposed a number of new conditions. Colt wanted to determine to which countries the Philippines could export, to require that raw materials be ordered through Colt, and to charge a royalty fee based on the Colt price for an M-16.” The Philippines did not find these conditions acceptable. Colt and the US government made moves to prevent overseas sales deals. For instance, Colt sent a letter in October 1981 to the Minister of Defense and Security of Indonesia, stating that “the contracts between Colt Firearms and their various licensees do not allow them to sell either rifles or parts to other countries.” A similarly worded letter was sent to the chief of the Ordnance Department of the Royal Thai Navy in June 1982, not by Colt, but by the Counselor for Commercial Affairs of the US Embassy.
Thus, by mid-1982, Elitool had 20,000 rifles with nowhere to go. Instead of returning the rifles to AFP, however, another deal involving the guns was approved by Marcos Sr., this time between Elitool and the Integrated National Police (INP). Pursuant to agreements made in April and September 1983, the INP, headed by Philippine Constabulary chief General Fidel Ramos, bought the rifles from Elitool, and Elitool was to use the proceeds of the sale to fund the replacement of the 20,000 guns for the AFP.
Letter from Manuel Elizalde to Ferdinand E. Marcos on the Elitool-INP supply contract for 20,000 rifles, from the PCGG files
Gen. Fabian Ver opposed Elitool-INP contract
General Ver did not like the deal. Writing to Marcos in July 1983, Ver insisted that the 20,000 rifles were AFP property, so “any agreement concerning the sale of the 20,000 rifles should be between the AFP and INP.” He wanted the ₱ 57 million that the INP was going to pay Elitool to go to the AFP instead. Marcos Sr. did not approve the proposal.
Elitool by then had yet to complete the original 172,500 M16 order, much more the 60,000 addition, largely because of the cancellation of the GOP-Colt agreements in June 1982 precisely because of the failed exportation plan. Without Colt, the AFP needed to find another raw materials and supplies purchaser, which it eventually did in 1983.
According to Elizalde, in a letter to Marcos Sr. dated September 13, 1982, it was the Philippine government that initiated the termination of the GOP-Colt agreements because of the export issue. He also emphasized that there was a need to pump money to the rifle program; “without the export, the Republic would sustain heavy financial and adverse socio-economic consequences,” Elizalde said.
Letter from Manuel Elizalde, Jr. to Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the export of M16A1 Rifles, with handwritten reply of Marcos, from the PCGG files
Elizalde’s letter was a cry for help to Marcos Sr., imploring that the GOP “obtain from the US Government official written consent for us to export M16A1 rifles to friendly countries”; the president’s handwritten reply was, “Why not bring the Armalite and manufacture this as such.” Thus, in 1983, Marcos’s recommendation led to Elitool obtaining the exclusive rights to manufacture, use, and sell Armalite’s AR18, AR5, and AR100-series rifles instead of Colt M16s. Armalite was already struggling financially during the early 1980s, and the M16 was patterned after Armalite’s AR15, so effectively selling to Elitool made sense. However, Armalite was never fully compensated during the time of Marcos Sr.; a May 15, 1986 communication to Jovito Salonga, head of the PCGG, from then AFP chief Fidel Ramos, states that by that time, Armalite had complied with about 90 percent of its commitments despite incomplete payments “due to budgetary constraints.”
There were budgetary constraints regarding the extended rifle production project even before the deal with Armalite. In December 1982, Budget Minister Manuel Alba sent a memorandum to Marcos on the “Additional Costs of the AFP SRDP Project, the M16 A1 Rifles.” By then, Alba said that ₱ 45 million had already been released (even without any additional rifles being produced). Defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile was asking for the release of an additional ₱ 25.89 million from the Defense Capability Defense Program (DCDP) of the Ministry of National Defense to increase the down payment to Elitool. Alba noted that only the reserve fund of the DCDP could be tapped, but doing so would increase the country’s already guaranteed end-of-year budget deficit. Alba suggested that they tap the 1983 SRDP appropriation instead, to which Marcos Sr. agreed.
Memorandum from budget minister Manuel Alba, on additional costs of AFP SRDP project, the M16 A1 Rifles, with handwritten approval of Ferdinand E. Marcos, from the PCGG files
In any case, even with funds from the INP, a new purchasing agent for the AFP, and the Armalite license, Elitool was still unable to replace the 20,000 rifles it borrowed when they became due in 1985. A year before, however, General Ver was still claiming that the Philippines was doing so well in rifle production that it was ready to export M16s. During a February 1984 visit of his Indonesian counterpart, Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani, Ver presented the former with a locally manufactured M16 as a gift, and was quoted by the local media as saying that “the Philippines is ready to export locally manufactured armalites (M-16s).” A declassified US State Department cable noted that as per defense ministry source, “Although [the GOP] is capable of exporting M-16 [it] was not now ready to do so,” because “problems with Colt would have to be sorted out first.”
The arms deal under the Cory Aquino administration
After the fall of the Marcos regime, Elitool offered to return the proceeds of the rifle sale to the INP, as it felt that it was exceedingly difficult to fulfill its obligations due to circumstances beyond its control. In an August 1987 letter to Col. Danilo Lazo, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Development of the AFP, Deogracias Salumbides, executive vice president and general manager of Elitool, said that they were unable to “effect immediate replacement of the rifles” because of “the unforeseen delay in the rehabilitation of government- owned facilities of the M16A1 Project” and the “failure of the AFP to provide the necessary spare parts and supplies.” “Manufacturing cost has gone up over the years,” continued Salumbides, “and even if we assume that production would presently commence, sales proceeds [presumably from sales to the AFP] will not be sufficient to cover the total replacement cost of the project.”
Nevertheless, in 1989, the Corazon Aquino administration, required Elitool—chaired by Manuel Elizalde’s sister-in-law, Josine Loinaz Elizalde—to deliver what it owed. Elitool eventually completed the original 172,500 order in 1987, and by March 1990 had delivered an additional 44,625 M16s. The plans to locally manufacture AR18s did not prosper, but the GOP, as represented by then Secretary of National Defense Fidel Ramos, did contract Elitool to also produce 3,500 prototype AR100 rifles, as well as another 12,000 M16s to be delivered between 1990-1991. It is unclear if Elitool was able to deliver the additional orders, or when Elitool formally folded up. In 1995, the rights to the Armalite trademark were sold to an American company, Eagle Arms.
Certification from Capt. Francis Mallillin on the number of M16 deliveries and cost of the rifles, from the PCGG files
A certification from BGen. Umberto Rodriguez, Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Development, dated 27 March 1990, noted that Elitool was fined a total of ₱ 17,175.59 for the delay in completing the original 172,500-rifle order. While Ramos was running for president in 1992, the INP sale issue was brought up against him, but no one was ever found to be criminally liable for the deal. When Ramos became president, he attempted to nominate Manuel Elizalde as ambassador to Mexico, but withdrew the nomination, reportedly because the public brought up the Marcos ties of the Elizaldes.
Certification from BGen. Umberto Rodriguez on the delay of Elitool’s M16 deliveries, from the PCGG files
According to a report by Luz Rimban, remnants of Elitool eventually formed Precision Technology Producers’ Cooperative, later Precision Munitions Inc., that, in the 2000s obtained contracts to refurbish the same Elitool M16s for the Philippine National Police, though questions were raised about the quality of their work. The Arsenal is far from what it was when it was funded by war reparations and FMS credits; it continues to produce munitions and small arms (of small quantity), and can repair, refurbish, or upgrade/convert rifles, but not mass produce them. Corazon Aquino’s Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, contains provisions on the GA, including one that mandates the Arsenal to “Formulate plans and programs to achieve self-sufficiency in arms, mortars and other weapons and munitions.” It was reported in 2016 that the Commission on Audit found that the GA was still using ammunition-producing machines between 12-39 years old, meaning it was still using equipment from the 1970s. News on COA’s most recent assessment stated that the GA missed its ammunition production targets, with the representatives from the GA attributing their output issue to old, failing machinery.
Today’s SRDP
Today’s SRDP proponents and advocates need to look at the supposed Marcos-era “success stories,” like the M16 project, with more sober eyes. Will they advocate contracting existing arms manufacturers, or help build up would-be crony firms via capital-intensive, debt-financed, and ultimately unsustainable projects? Will they push for exports to the possible detriment of building up domestic defense capabilities? Will making the Philippines, by hook or by crook, a global arms dealer be made part and parcel of self-reliance?
The House’s SRDP bill, HB 9713, and the Senate’s version, SB 2455 (of which Imee is a co-author), have both been approved on third reading, and, as of May 22, 2024, are set for bicameral conference committee reconciliation. Both contain a provision mandating the government to “promote the export of locally made materiel” and local enterprises to other countries; the Senate version encourages, while the House version requires, the allocation of funds “for the purpose of such promotion.” The Senate version orders an initial ₱ 1 billion to be appropriated for the implementation of the SRDP program.
Why is a potentially massive public event in support of President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.’s brand of governance seemingly shrouded in secrecy and deception?
On Sunday, Jan. 28, a kick-off rally for the Bagong Pilipinas campaign will be held at the Quirino Grandstand in Rizal Park, Manila. A Jan. 22 news release by the Presidential Communications Office (PCO), announced that “government officials, celebrities and other personalities,” as well as the president himself, are expected to attend the rally, which “the Filipino public” can attend.
Bagong Pilipinas, based on a memorandum circular issued by the Office of the President in June 2023, is the “[Bongbong Marcos] Administration’s brand of governance and leadership,” which is “characterized by a principled, accountable and dependable government reinforced by unified institutions of society, whose common objective is to realize the goals and aspirations of every Filipino.” The memorandum circular also mandated the use of the Bagong Pilipinas logo by all national government agencies.
Not only is it carried by government websites and stamped on official letterheads, it’s also on trains and in train stations.
Also well-publicized are the Bagong Pilipinas creative competitions for college students. The deadline for these contests—in songwriting, essay writing, mural painting, and spoken word poetry—as well as a short film competition with the theme “Ano ang Bagong Pilipinas (What is a new Philippines)?” was on November 20, 2023, 5 p.m. The work of the winners, yet to be announced, are expected to show “the Filipino youth’s aspirations for a Bagong Pilipinas or the inspirational Filipino excellence and unbreakable spirit that will enable this call-to-action realization.” The total value of the prizes for the competitions is substantial; the national level prizes alone total almost P2.2 million.
Interestingly, a curious alteration was made by the PCO to their October 7, 2023Facebookpostsabout the contests. The guidelines for each of the contests can be viewed in pictures attached to the posts. Without any accessible explanation online, however, the picture-guidelines now state that the deadline for the competitions was on January 12, 2024, 5 p.m. The guidelines on PCO’s Instagram account remain unaltered. What is even more curious is the date when the pictures were replaced, which one can confirm by looking at the edit history of the posts: January 16, 2024. How then would prospective entrants have known that the deadline for entries was extended by twenty-four days, when the surreptitious “announcement” of the extension was made four days after the new deadline?
“Late submissions will not be accepted,” state both the old and the new guidelines. Was the alteration made to better link the competitions with the seemingly sudden kick-off rally?
Screenshots from the PCO Facebook Page
In any case, given the ubiquity of Bagong Pilipinas, as well as the various Bagong Pilipinas Serbisyo Fair caravans held throughout the country last year, it is a puzzle why a kick-off rally is still necessary. Among those who have wondered aloud about the rally is the president’s elder sister, Senator Imee Marcos.
In a Jan. 20 radio interview, Imee talked about obtaining a copy of a letter, issued by an undersecretary of a government agency, which purportedly ordered government employees to attend the kick-off. Sen. Marcos called the event a “BBM [Bongbong Marcos] loyalty rally.” Allegedly, state employees in attendance would do so on official time, and be provided with food and transportation. “Kaninong pera nanaman ito? Bakit maghahakot?” she asked; “Hindi ba mas dinidiin na insecure sila o tagilid, may destab? Hindi ko maiintindihan ang pakay nito,” she added, alluding to rumored destabilization plots against her brother’s administration. A day before her interview, Politiko also published a “Politiskoop” about a communication very similar to the one Sen. Marcos described, stating that it ordered “regional directors to identify 250 employees who will attend [the rally].” T-shirts and entitlement to compensatory time off were also supposedly among the “perks” of attending the event.
It is notable that the primary Facebook pages of several national government agencies all posted about the event sometime between 6 and 7 p.m. on Jan. 22, several hours after the only news about the event, besides those on the “hakot” memoranda, focused on road closures and traffic rerouting because of the rally.
The text of their posts were standardized (“Halina at maging parte ng pagbabago para sa ating sarili, komunidad, at bayan!” they all state), with an accompanying poster, featuring what appears to be a composite of photographs of the well-attended “Uniteam” rallies during the 2022 election campaign (without highlighting the other half of the Uniteam, Vice President Sara Duterte), that each department/office modified with their logo.
Along with Philippine National Police posts about a Jan. 19 initial coordination meeting for the rally, and a Jan. 18 ocular visit to Quirino Grandstand by the National Secretariat of the Bagong Pilipinas Serbisyo Fair, it seems that the planning and coordination for what is projected to be an event attended by thousands is only being done less than two weeks before it is scheduled.
Which is highly unlikely. Indeed, when one searches for more information about the kick-off rally online, one will find various documents and posts from 2023 referring to a Bagong Pilipinas Kick-Off rally at the Quirino Grandstand scheduled on December 10, 2023. Among these are Department of Interior and Local Government memorandum circular, dated November 28, 2023, asking Local Government Units to “Support the launch and kick-off ceremony of the Bagong Pilipinas campaign through the attendance of the Local Chief Executive, other local officials, and representatives from various sectors in the LGU, on December 10, 2023, at the Quirino Grandstand, Rizal Park, City of Manila”; a Request for Quotation, dated November 14, 2023 from the Bids and Awards Committee of the PCO for “Printed Collaterals for Bagong Pilipinas Kick-off Rally Luzon” with an approved budget for the contract (ABC) amounting to P275,000.00 and specifying the delivery date to be December 8, 2023 at the Quirino Grandstand; a Facebook post, dated November 5, 2023 from the Angono [Rizal] Public Information Office supporting the December 10 kick-off ceremony; and information about one of the rally’s performers posted on Instagram on December 1, 2023.
There are also documents without a date, but are clearly concerned with the Dec. 10 rally. There is a PCO Invitation to Bid, dated October 31,2023, for the procurement of tokens and collaterals for the “Bagong Pilipinas Launch.” These tokens/collaterals are aprons, ballers, caps, car stickers, hoodie jackets, tote bags, t-shirts, and tumblers, all with an ABC of nearly P1 million each, totaling over P7.5 million.
Such documents give Sen. Marcos the answer to her question, “Kaninong pera nanaman ito?”
There is a Department of Public Works and Highways department memorandum, dated November 23, 2023, concerning Memorandum Circular no. 39, signed by Executive Secretary Lucas P. Bersamin, “Directing all national government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, government financial institutions, and state universities and colleges, and encouraging all local government units, to attend, participate and provide full support to the [undated] Bagong Pilipinas Official Campaign Kick-off Rally.” The MC, dated November 9, 2023, directs the PCO “to lead and organize the conduct of the Bagong Pilipinas Official Campaign Kick-Off Rally.”
Interestingly, there is no copy of Memorandum Circular no. 39, s. 2023 downloadable from the online Official Gazette, or anywhere else—including the PCO website and Facebook page—besides the DPWH website as of this writing. After MC no. 38, issued on October 27, 2023, is MC no. 40, released on November 14. Even trying to open a possibly hidden page on the MC based on the format of the URLs or addresses for the other circulars (i.e., https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2023/11/09/memorandum-circular-no-39-s-2023/) leads to a “page not found” page.
Of course, there was no Bagong Pilipinas kick-off rally at Rizal Park in December last year. One explanation for the event’s cancellation is the Facebook announcement by the PCO on December 5, 2023, at exactly 12 midnight, that the president contracted COVID-19 for the third time, and that he was advised to isolate for five days, or until December 10. The lack of an official notice of cancellation, however, led to oddposts from unofficial sources that simultaneously stated that the December 10 rally was cancelled but the event was also “fake news.” Online remnants, however, clearly indicate otherwise.
Extended bidding may have also been a factor in the cancellation. An Invitation to Bid (second round) for the “Rental of Technical Equipment for the Bagong Pilipinas Kick-off Rally in Luzon for the Presidential Communications Office” was issued on December 7, 2023. The ABC for each lot totaled P16.4 million. The first Invitation to Bid was issued on Nov. 6. As per the bid documents, the equipment to be rented include various speakers, confetti machines, a thousand steel barricades, thirty-nine mist fans, and seventy portalets. It is unclear when the PCO made the decision to procure one lot each of customized lanyards (ABC, P200,000.00) and customized t-shirts (P300,000.00) “for Bagong Pilipinas Launch” and arm sleeves (P300,000.00) “for Bagong Pilipinas Communication Kit,” but the Request for Quotation for these lots that can be downloaded from PCO website was issued on December 15, 2023.
There is clearly a lack of transparency from Bongbong’s communications team regarding these projects. To reiterate what has been detailed elsewhere, those charged with presidential communications claim to be against disinformation, but they have, several times since Bongbong’s term started, reproduced lies about the president, stated by the president himself or his allies. Are they now also lying or keeping secrets about themselves, ironically regarding projects worth well over P20 million for promoting “a principled, accountable and dependable government”?
Incidentally, the upcoming rally will not be the first event at the Quirino Grandstand featuring “Bagong Pilipinas” in connection with a Philippine president in recent memory. “Bagong Pilipinas” was the title of the “inaugural song” of President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III, whose inauguration was held at the Grandstand on June 30, 2010. Written by Ogie Alcasid and Noel Cabangon, the lyrics of the song repeatedly invoke unity (the first lines are “Anuman ang iyong kulay/Ang Pilipinas ay nagtagumpay”).
The newer Bagong Pilipinas campaign can easily adopt the song for itself, happy though Bongbong seems to be with recycling the Bagong Lipunan/New Society anthems of his father’s dictatorship.
A whole book, Marcos Lies, has already been written documenting in copious detail the Marcoses’ penchant for making untrue statements mythologizing themselves. But at least one Marcos, the president himself, Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos Jr., is still constantly giving material for future volumes, undermining his own administration’s anti-misinformation drive.
Many of these false statements are being circulated—in the form of press releases, transcripts, and audiovisual recordings—by offices under the Presidential Communications Office (PCO). On August 14, 2023, the Marcos Jr. administration launched a Media and Information Literacy Campaign, popularly billed as the government’s anti-fake news initiative. The PCO is the lead agency of the campaign. At launch, some found the campaign to be, at the very least, tinged with irony, given various evidence-based claims that Marcos partly relied on massive disinformation during his presidential run. During the recent 2024 budget deliberations in Congress, the PCO, based on its own reportage, “earned the approval and support of the House of Representatives on its Media and Information Literacy (MIL) campaign,” after proposing the allocation of ₱16.899 million for the program. Will some of that money go to correcting false or inaccurate statements even if they are made by the president himself, or help in further propagating them?
Rice price
An October 7, 2023 news release from the PCO bore the headline: “Price Cap Stabilized Rice Prices – PBBM.” The article does not explain how the president, concurrently secretary of agriculture, determined that the price ceilings he set on regular millied and well-milled rice (via Executive Order no. 39, issued on Aug. 31, 2023, which took effect on Sept. 5, 2023) directly led to rice price stabilization. The order lifting the price cap, Executive Order no. 42, issued on Oct. 4, 2023, simply states that the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Trade and Industry “have jointly recommended the lifting of the mandated price ceilings in view of the decreasing rice prices in the domestic market, increasing supply of rice stock, and declining global rice prices”; again, no causal relationship between the price cap and price stabilization is established. Critics have pointed out that rice prices have in fact been increasing, and is the main driver of recent food inflation; indeed, the Philippine Statistics Authority stated that the “uptrend in the food inflation [in September 2023] was mainly due to the higher annual increment in rice with inflation rate of 19.8 percent during the month from 9.1 percent in the previous month.”
In March this year, rice industry monitor Bantay Bigas also called out the president for stating that his promise of lowering the price of rice to 20 pesos per kilo was close to becoming a reality (“Kaunti na lang, maibababa na natin ‘yan,” were his exact words). Clearly, rice prices are still nowhere near 20 pesos per kilo. That for months now, Marcos has seemed unable to be truthful about the price of rice should not be surprising to those who know the various falsities that he has propagated both about himself and his family, ranging from false claims about his educational attainment to characterizations of his father’s dictatorship. Well into the second year of the Marcos Jr. administration, dishonesty still readily attaches to the Marcos name.
Relocated birthplace
Some recent false information circulating about Marcos may be in the nature of clerical errors. For instance, in his official website, pbbm.com.ph, the president’s biography states that he was born “in the town of Batac, Ilocos Norte.” Marcos was born at Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital in Santa Ana, Manila. He did not even grow up in Ilocos Norte (by his own admission, he can hardly be considered fluent in Ilocano), though he had to claim residency there during the times that he was either an elected executive (with a reputation for being an absentee governor) or a congressional representative.
Screenshot of Bongbong biography with incorrect birthplace, from pbbm.com.ph
The “error,” if indeed inadvertent, has been reproduced in mainstreamnews outlets and state-run media and in government websites such as those of the Philippine Consulates General in San Francisco and New York and the Climate Change Commission. It seems unlikely that Bongbong ordered that his place of birth be changed to that of his paternal grandfather, since such information can be easily verified. However, one wonders if he has not noticed the relocation of his birthplace on his website, which superseded bongbongmarcos.com after he became “PBBM.” The profile is otherwise fairly factual, even stating at least one truth that Bongbong himself does not accept: the fact that he was defeated in the 2016 elections.
“Historic Visit”
There are other lies, also easily verifiable, that Marcos has recently echoed and amplified himself. On September 23, 2023, Marcos was in Iriga City, Camarines Sur to distribute sacks of seized smuggled rice to 4Ps beneficiaries. Both the PCO and the Philippine Information Agency reported on a claim made by Marcos that because of that visit, he is the first president in 55 years to come to the Rinconada (5th) District of Camarines Sur, which is made up of Iriga City and the towns of Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi, Bula, and Nabua; purportedly, the district’s last presidential visitor was Marcos’s father, Ferdinand Sr. The alleged source of the claim repeated uncritically by Marcos is Camarines Sur 5th District Representative Migz Villafuerte, who first entered politics in his early 20s in 2013. Both the young Villafuerte and senior citizen Marcos appear to have forgotten about a 2016 visit to Iriga by President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino. That the visit was in line with the campaign of the Roxas-Robredo tandem endorsed by Aquino should be a non-issue, given that Bongbong mentioned that his father’s first visit to Iriga, back in 1965, was also for electoral purposes.
If any and all visits count, Noynoy also went to Iriga in 2012 to visit two wakes—that of then Secretary of Justice Leila de Lima’s father and that of Private First Class Arwin Martirez, who was killed in action in Basilan. If only working visits are counted, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo went to Iriga on Sept. 4, 2008, as part of a tour of projects being done for Camarines Sur. She attended a briefing on the Bicol River Basin Development Project there. Only President Duterte appears to have never visited the Rinconada district while he was in office, though he did conduct an aerial survey of areas in Camarines Sur hit by Tropical Depression Usman in January 2019, which included Iriga, Nabua, Bula, and Baao. Even that should be sufficient to challenge Marcos’s claim that only presidents named Marcos have visited the district or Iriga in particular (“Marcos lang ang bumibisita sa inyo na pangulo [dahil] malapit kayo sa puso namin”).
“Founding Figure”
Charitably, Marcos’s fib about his “historic visit” was simply an attempt to endear himself to a captive audience. But one questionable claim he recently made may have been designed to suggest that he had political clout independent from being a Marcos or being a close associate of another political juggernaut, the Dutertes. On Aug. 24, 2023, an oathtaking of new members of Marcos’s political party, the Partido Federal ng Pilipinas (PFP), was held in Malacañang Palace. Marcos gave a speech, stating that the party was “Headed of course — who has been helmed really since the beginning of the campaign by Governor Jun Tamayo. But of course the origin of this goes back to my first run as vice president with General Tom Lantion that he – siya ang nauna that proposed this.” Marcos ran for vice president in 2016, while he was a member of the Nacionalista Party.
Oathtaking of New Partido Federal ng Pilipinas Members, 24 August 2023, from the RTVM YouTube channel
Based on archived versions of the party’s currently inaccessible website, PFP’s president when Marcos joined the party back in 2021 was indeed South Cotabato governor Reynaldo “Jun” Tamayo Jr. PFP’s first leaders/founders include former Land Bank of the Philippines director Jayvee Hinlo and former Department of Agrarian Reform secretary John Castriciones. Castriciones was also the founder of the Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte-National Executive Coordinating Committee (MRRD-NECC). In October 2018, PFP was formally accredited by the Commission on Elections. Bongbong back then was a private citizen, having lost his bid for the vice presidency. Even during the 2019 elections, with a Marcos (Imee) running for a national position, PFP was associated with Duterte, not Bongbong. Marcos’s entry into PFP in October 2021 was not without controversy; Castriciones was among those booted out of the party’s leadership before Marcos became the party’s standard bearer. Also preceding Marcos’s entry into the party was the designation of his legal counsel and later short-lived executive secretary Victor Rodriguez as PFP’s executive vice president; in November 2022, Rodriguez was also kicked out of PFP for “acts inimical to the party” and being an “undesirable civil servant.”
A few months after Marcos won, an article in the Manila Times gave the longer version of the PFP’s (revised) history, as told by Lantion and Atty. George Briones, who were indeed with the party from the beginning. Hinlo and Castriciones are not mentioned by name, nor is Rodriguez given any mention. Lantion describes himself as Bongbong’s security when the latter was studying in La Salle Greenhills, as well as a former close-in security of Ferdinand Sr. Briones called Bongbong a “political genius” responsible “for making the PFP what it is today.” But even this Marcos-focused narrative does not state that they had anything to do with Marcos’s vice presidential campaign, though in another twist (contradicting all previous claims and publicly available documentation), Lantion told the Daily Tribune back in July 2023 that Marcos in fact became a member of PFP on October 5, 2018, the day the party was accredited.
During the Malacañang oathtaking, Marcos also claimed that PFP was the “majority party.” Either Marcos does not understand what a majority party is, or he is overselling the strength of his party, which still seems slow in attracting newcomers, even if PFP’s most prominent members currently include himself and his son, Ilocos Norte First District Representative Sandro Marcos. Sandro, along with a little over a dozen governors and a few presidential appointees, became the newest members of PFP during the August oathtaking. A Manila Bulletin article on the father-son joining correctly states that the “dominant political party in the House” is Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (party president: Marcos’s first cousin, Martin Romualdez), but notes that that party is “closely linked” to PFP. Perhaps Bongbong is simply being truthful about the state of party politics in the Philippines.
Youth Act author
There is a grain of truth in another false claim that Marcos recently reiterated: that he is the main author of Republic Act No. 8044, or the Youth in Nation-Building Act. In a recorded message for the commemoration of the establishment of the National Youth Commision, uploaded on August 12, 2023, Marcos said that “in [his] time as congressman,” he authored RA no. 8044, “the law that created [the commission].” He also said that when he was senator, he also authored RA 10742, or the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Reform Act of 2015, a slightly less (but still) controversial claim.
Since 2017, after the legislative histories of post-EDSA Revolution laws became accessible online through the House of Representatives’ Legislative Information System or LEGIS, Marcos’s role in the development of the Youth in Nation-Building Act has been fact-checked or contextualizedseveraltimes. Records clearly show that Marcos was the principal author of one of several bills seeking to create a youth body during the Ninth Congress (1992-1995), and that these bills were substituted by House Bill no. 11614, whose principal author is Jaime C. Lopez of the City of Manila’s second district; Marcos is listed as second co-author, after Zamboanga del Norte’s Artemio Adasa. Lopez was one of the first members of Lakas-NUCD, President Fidel Ramos’s coalition.
LEGIS further shows that Marcos was not the first to file a Youth Commission bill during the Ninth Congress. First was HB no. 15, filed by Lopez in June 1992; second was HB 2872, “An Act Establishing a Permanent and Continuing Youth Leadership Development Institute, and Appropriating Funds Therefor,” filed by Adasa in September 1992; third was Marcos’s HB 4660, filed on November 16, 1992; and fourth was HB 4936, filed on November 23, 1992 by Dante Liban of Quezon City. Even earlier, in February 1988, during the Eighth Congress, Adasa had already filed HB 5400, “An Act Creating the Philippine National Youth Commission, Defining Its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, and Appropriating Funds Therefor.”
During the consolidated bill’s second reading, it had six sponsors. Ramon Durano III, as chair of the House Committee on Youth and Sports Development, gave his sponsorship speech first; Marcos was fourth in line. Voting unanimously, the bill was approved on third reading by the House on March 21, 1994. The bill was soon transmitted to the Senate. Numerous revisions were made to the Senate counterpart bill, SB 1977.
There is no readily available evidence that Marcos actively participated in the reconciliation of SB 1977 and HB 11614. Reportage of his activities in May-June 1995 suggest that the legislator was mainly preoccupied with protesting his electoral defeat and the ultimately unsuccessful attempts to keep his mother, Imelda Marcos, from occupying the congressional seat that she won. Thereafter, in July 1995, citizen Bongbong also had to deal with his conviction for several tax cases.
Moreover, news articles regarding the Youth Commission bill within the year of its enactment stated that Jaime Lopez was the bill’s principal author, or mentioned Bongbong as being key to the law’s finalization or enactment. Lopez appealed for the Senate to pass the measure, which, again, had been through numerous revisions in the upper chamber.
A Philippines Free Press article, dated July 29, 1995, states that “the [youth] commission’s creation was a hard-won battle” as “youth leaders had vigorously lobbied the 8th and 9th Congresses for its creation.” Indeed, it seems that the only times Bongbong’s role in the creation of the National Youth Commission was highlighted before the RA no. 8044’s enactment were in articles specifically about Bongbong. For instance, an article in the Sept. 18, 1993 issue of the Manila Bulletin, titled “Philippine Youth Commision: Let the Young Voice be Heard,” is accompanied only by four photos of Bongbong, with captions “A body like PYC is urgently needed,” “They oppose it because of who I am,” “I was a rebel teenager too,” and “I want a peaceful life for my son.” The article said that he was “making the rounds of youth groups to collect suggestions, recommendations and needless to say support for the PRC bill,” but there were accusations that he “will just use this as a vehicle for [his] own political ambitions.” Again, Marcos was one of many (and never principal) proponents, authors, and co-sponsors of a youth commission law. Another article, in Asiaweek‘s July 7, 1993 issue, says that his pet bill “is one to create a Philippine Youth Commission,” but that the definition of youth for him were those ages 15-40; the law that was passed limited the youth to those ages 15-30.
In the same article, Bongbong reportedly stated that he obtained the equivalent of a master’s degree in Oxford, but Asiaweek included a parenthetical fact check: “Oxford says he was granted a non-degree Special Diploma in Social Studies in 1978.”
Given that Marcos was far from the first to come up with a law establishing a Philippine Youth Commission, can he at least claim that he was the most influential legislator in the development of the Youth in Nation-Building Act? In his infamous 1995 interview with Kris Aquino (where he says that he turned seven during his birthday in Malacañang; he actually turned eight) despite a portion where they discuss the youth and the congressman giving a closing statement directed to young Filipinos, Marcos never discussed the pending bill. In his 1994 interview with Jun Urbano (as his “Mr. Shooli” character), despite discussing a range of subjects (and lying about his educational attainment), Marcos did not say anything about the creation of a youth commission. His profile in the July 1992-April 1993 issue of Congressional Highlights, which devoted to the first ten months of the Ninth Congress, does not list the Philippine Youth Commission bill as among his priority bills (among those of neophyte representatives, only the profile of Nicetas Panes of Iloilo lists “An Act to Establish the Philippine Commission on Youth Development and for Other Purposes” among his legislative priorities; Panes was listed as a co-author of both Lopez’s HB 15 and Marcos’s HB 4660). In an opinion column in the Manila Standard, dated April 10, 1995, the late Nelson Navarro noted, “Despite the hoopla generated by his 1992 election to his father’s old congress seat, he has not created any waves in legislation or public debate.” Even a long-time ally, Joseph Estrada, found him unremarkable; in September 1994, the Standard quoted the then vice president saying, “I think Bongbong Marcos still needs more experience; I would advise him to seek one more term in Congress” rather than gunning for a Senate seat. Based on some accounts, such as the editorial of the February 6-12 issue of WE Forum, Congressman Marcos was best known for filing a resolution urging President Ramos to allow Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s body to lie in state in Malacañang and to give the long-dead dictator a state funeral; with less than half voting “yea,” the House did not adopt the resolution.
Framed collage on NYC and Bongbong, Bahay Ugnayan. Photo by Larah Del Mundo
(Dis)information Center
After Bongbong, perhaps the most vocal propagator of the myth that the current president “founded” the National Youth Commission is Ronald Gian Cardema, current chairman of the NYC and leader of the Duterte Youth and the Kabataan for Bongbong Movement. Inside the Bahay Ugnayan, one of the Malacañang Heritage Mansions made accessible to the public in May this year, is a framed photo-collage of pictures showing Cardema with Bongbong (and Imee), emblazoned with the words “Salamat, Mahal na Pangulo! Principal Author of Republic Act No. 8044, the law that created the National Youth Commission.”
This is one of many lies inside what is essentially a Bongbong Marcos museum administered by an Advisory Board chaired by the president’s Social Secretary, as per Executive Order no. 26, s. 2023. The whole heritage project, which also includes a museum for past Philippine presidents in the Teus Mansion, is attributed to the First lady, Liza Araneta Marcos. Part of Bahay Ugnayan took material from Bongbong’s defunct website (some of which, including school-related records, can still be accessed via Bongbong’s Flickr account). Among these are evidence presented or summaries of claims made by Bongbong to bolster his claim that he was cheated during the 2016 elections, including a crate marked “Iriga City, Cam Sur” and a large poster highlighting undervotes.
Poster on undervotes, Bahay Ugnayan. Photo by Larah Del Mundo
The museum also claims that Marcos graduated from Oxford University, and the reason he discontinued further studies at the Wharton School of Business was his election as vice governor of Ilocos Norte—both proven untrue by documentary evidence (including the Wharton transcript on display at the museum). Besides such tired claims, there is a bit of fudging done by a huge poster titled “Support Groups,” which features photos and a 786-entry list. Entries 365 to 675 are all “Solid BBM Worldwide Movement” followed by a number in sequence from 2022 to 2023; entries 141-203 are all Kasapi followed by a number from 101 to 141. Entries 717-725 all appear to be chapters of TEAM BBM 2022, while 773-779 are all chapters or reiterations of We Love Marcos Global BBM Forever. The last two entries are both Zambales Solid BBM Supporters. Among many similar entries, entry 141, 258, 267, 275, 285, 351, 765, 705, 706, 781 are “Individual,” “Member,” “Motorcycle riders,” “N/A,” “Number 3,” “Selected team leader,” “Student,” “Suffix,” “Vlogger,” and “Womens,” respectively. Marcos’s party, PFP, is simply entry 298 among other “support groups.” After cleaning up the list of bloat, it can be significantly shortened (by more than half), and make one ask exactly who were the “grassroots” supporters of the 2022 Marcos campaign.
Support Groups poster, Bahay Ugnayan. Photo by Nixcharl Noriega
All these (among others), Bongbong unleashed within less than a year and a half of his presidency, alongside various other supplementary actions that help give life to the myth of Marcosian greatness—from uploading a copy of the propaganda film that helped elect Ferdinand Sr. in 1965, Iginuhit ng Tadhana, in the Philippine News Agency’s YouTube channel, to removing the anniversary of the People Power Revolution from the official list of 2024 holidays only because Feb. 25, 2024 falls on a Sunday.
Figure 1. Groundbreaking ceremony in Apatot, San Sebastian, Ilocos Sur for the Marcos monument. Photo from the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur’s Facebook page, April 21, 2023.
A monument being built in a town in Ilocos Sur tries to connect the late president Ferdinand E. Marcos to a wartime heroic operation that has no factual record of his participation.
The designation of the landing site of the USS Gar submarine, which brought armaments that led to the defeat of the Japanese Imperial army in the same site as the Marcos monument, raises questions because a historical marker on the same operation exists in another site.
Groundbreaking ceremony in San Esteban
The monument had a groundbreaking ceremony on April 20 in San Esteban, a seaside town in Ilocos Sur.
The event was among the events during the town’s fourth Seafood Festival. In attendance were Provincial Board Member Evaristo Singson III, representing his father, Governor Jeremias “Jerry” Singson; Vice Governor Ryan Luis Singson (son of former governor Luis “Chavit” Singson); and other provincial officials.
The Facebook page of the provincial government of Ilocos Sur posted the next day about the groundbreaking ceremony but did not explain why a monument to Marcos was being built in San Esteban.
A social media report offers a sketchy justification for the monument’s erection: “A monument of former president, Major Ferdinand E. Marcos will be erected here, Apatot San Esteban Ilocos Sur.The area was the landing site of a submarine [USS Gar] carrying armaments for USAFIP-NL [United States Army Forces in the Philippines-Northern Luzon] during World War 2 that led to the downfall of Gen Tomoyoki Yamashita in Bessang Pass.”
There were two banners that stressed the significance of the occasion. One connected the building of the Marcos monument to the rehabilitation and improvement of the USS Gar landing site.
The other banner welcomed Sen. Maria Imelda Josefa “Imee” R. Marcos along with Gov. Jerry Singson, Cong. Kristine Singson-Meehan, former Gov. Chavit Singson, and Candon City Mayor Eric Singson. Sen. Marcos did not attend the groundbreaking ceremony.
Another marker of USS Gar landing in Santiago Cove
Forty years ago, on December 27, 1982, then president Ferdinand E. Marcos himself, with First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, led the dedication of a marble marker from the National Historical Institute (NHI) (now the National Historical Commission of the Philippines, or NHCP) to commemorate the landing in San Esteban of USS Gar. That marker was destroyed in a typhoon in 2001. A new one was put in its place, fronting a replica in concrete of the USS Gar. The new Marcos monument will be built beside the marker and the Gar replica.
Figure 2. The current memorial to the USS Gar landing in San Sebastian, Ilocos Sur. Photo from Ilocos Sur Gov. Jerry Singson’s Facebook page, November 4, 2020.
Rendered in all caps, the text of the present marker, which almost perfectly reiterates that of the older one, reads:
Twice surfacing at Santiago Cove on November 21, 1944, the USS Gar landed on this beach commandoes of the Army of the United States with equipment, arms, ammunitions and supplies led by Captains William Vaughn and William Farell were Lts. Fred Behan and Donald Jamison with two other Americans and Larry Guzman with other Filipinos of the First Filipino regiment. The landing was effected by USAFIP, NL under Col. Russell W. Volckmann with other paramilitary and guerilla units by order of Volckmann, Jamison and Maj. Ferdinand E. Marcos sneaked through the cordon of Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita to an air strip in Isabela and flew to Camp Spencer.
Besides using numerals instead of spelled-out numbers in two instances, the previous marker clearly placed a period between “supplies” and “led” and one between “guerrilla units” and “by order of Volckmann,” avoiding the current run-on sentences. But evidence shows that the text has bigger problems than the grammatical variety.
The 1982 NHI marker on the landing of USS Gar in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur bears significant errors that should put in question why the marker is in San Esteban in the first place. It is also laced with a lie traceable to Marcos that vested in himself a certain wartime exploit that vaguely connected him to the submarine landing but is categorically unsupported by any factual and historical evidence.
Adding doubt to the 1982 marker is the existence of another historical marker commemorating the Gar landing where it actually happened, in Santiago Cove, Sabangan, Santiago, Ilocos Sur.
Submarine bearing supplies for resistance forces
In mid-1944, as the United States-led Allied Forces made its way from Australia and the southwest Pacific islands to reconquer the Philippines from the forces of the Japanese empire, efforts were made to communicate, consolidate, and supply the guerilla resistance forces in Northern Philippines, or specifically the United States Army Forces in the Philippines-Northern Luzon (USAFIP-NL), then under the command of Col. Russell W. Volckmann.
Patricia Murphy Minch, whose father, Col. Arthur Philip Murphy served as Volckmann’s chief of staff and intelligence officer, wrote in the The Luckiest Guerilla, a biography of her father, that a rumor about a submarine bearing supplies for resistance forces in Luzon was received by her father with “far greater significance” than the news on the radio of US forces’ impressive victories as it fought its way back to the Philippines.
In Volckmann’s view, as expressed in his wartime biography, American Guerilla, by Mike Guardia, “Resupply meant relief from chronic shortages that had plagued them since Bataan. If the supply train remained unbroken from now until the Allied invasion of Luzon, Volckmann and his men would no longer have to rely on scavenging from the Japanese or continue borrowing from the local civilians.”
On August 27, 1944, the USS Stingray (SS-186) that departed from Australia on August 16 reached Caunayan Bay, Bangui Bay, Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte under hostile conditions. As noted by the Naval History and Heritage Command of the US Navy, despite the odds, “Special mission successfully accomplished 27 August 1944 after undergoing depth charge attacks and being lightly worked over while reconnoitering designated spot. Landed all personnel and 60% of supplies. Forced to depart after 24 assorted Jap armed sea trucks passed spot.”
Lt. Jose Valera led the fifteen-man radio and demolitions team that came from USS Stingray. But it was not until November 19, 1944 that Valera and his team were able to contact Volckmann’s headquarter in Benguet.
An NHCP marker of the Stingray landing, sponsored by the Philippine Veterans Bank, was installed at the landing site in 2018.
After USS Stingray’s landing, another submarine was supposed to deliver supplies to the USAFIP-NL by September 1944. This did not happen. Years later, Volckmann would learn that the submarine that was supposed to do the supply run was sunk by the US’s own Air Force.
Another attempt was made in October 1944. It was again a failure. Then came the USS Gar (SS-206), the second submarine to venture along the Ilocos coast to deliver supplies to the USAFIP-NL headed by Volckmann.
Figure 3. The USS Gar (SS-206), August 19, 1945. From US National Archives.
The 1982 NHI marker at Apatot, San Esteban states that the USS Gar twice surfaced at Santiago Cove on November 21, 1944. The date in the marker is off by one day. USS Gar’s “Report of War Patrol Number Fourteen” dated November 30, 1944 states that its journey to the Ilocos coast started on November 13, 1944 at Mios Woendi Lagoon (part of the Schouten Islands of Papua province, Indonesia), then a forward base of the US Navy.
When it left Mios Woendi Lagoon, USS Gar had a load of “16 army personnel, 4 officers and 12 men, and 30 tons of material” with “Captain W.D. Vaughan, 0-23978, USA in charge of party.”
On November 20, 1944 it delivered supplies to resistance fighters in Mindoro, its first mission. At 5:16 a.m., November 22, 1944, USS Gar’s log reads, “Submerged off Darigayos River, the spot designated for second mission, and commenced closing the beach.”
The log was no doubt correct on the time and date it recorded, but it was mistaken about where USS Gar actually was. And it was this error that would explain why it had to surface twice in Santiago Cove, a place that is definitely not in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur nor was it Darigayos Cove in Luna, La Union.
The precise coordinates of USS Gar’s location was 17°17’02.0″N 120°24’05.0″E (this is a current rendering of the original recorded coordinates 17-17.2N, 120-24.5E). This record is at the “Submarine Activities Connected with Guerrilla Organizations” made available online by the Naval History and Heritage Command of the US Navy. The coordinates situate the USS Gar fronting the Santiago Cove at Sabangan, Santiago, Ilocos Sur.
In the failed October 1944 supply run, Volckmann had communicated to the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) command in Australia two submarine landing sites. On November 11, 1944, SWPA asked Volckmann if the same rendezvous points could be used. Volckmann, in his November 16, 1944 reply said yes. “Assure Navy that contact can be made successfully and safely at both points. Will be ready and able to make contact on and from November 22 at Point One – Darigayos Inlet and at Point Two – Santiago Cove as previously stated.”
Figure 4. Communication between Volckmann and MacArthur on the possible landing sites for USS Gar, November 16, 1944. From the MacArthur Archives.
Volckmann headed the group that waited for the USS Gar in Darigayos, while in Santiago Cove, the group was headed by Maj. George M. Barnett, sub-commander of USAFIP-NL’s second district (the provinces of La Union and southern Ilocos Sur).
It was Barnett’s group that made contact with USS Gar at 6:00 p.m., November 22, 1944. Still thinking that they were at Darigayos Cove, they asked Bartnett if he was Volckmann. Barnett told them he was not, and that they were at the secondary site.
USS Gar’s war patrol report admitted plainly the error in their navigation. “We were amazed to learn that we were at our alternate spot. (Santiago Cove) Later developments proved that we were extremely fortunate to have contacted this party first.”
“Due to the scarcity of men and boats Barnett cannot unload us tonight, however Major Volkman [sic] down at the primary spot was thought to have sufficient men and boats to take care of us. He also thought that Volkman had some intelligence information which he wanted us to take back.” The log continued: “In hopes of completing the mission as soon as possible it was decided to take Major Barnett and four body guards aboard and proceed to the primary spot to contact and unload with Major Volkman.”
Before departing for Darigayos on November 22, Barnett informed them that “there were three small Jap patrol boats 4 miles to the north . . . at San Esteban which patrol 200 yards off the reef parallel to the coast.” Further proof that in the accounts of those involved first-hand in the landing, they were not in San Esteban.
At 9:00 p.m., Gar was at Darigayos. A party led by Barnett was made to land to look for Volckmann’s group. They were not there. Instead, there were Japanese patrols in the area.
“Spot One compromised completely by the enemy,” Volckmann warned the SWPA command on November 22, 1944. “Request that Spot Two be used.”
Gar went back to Santiago Cove at 1:00 a.m., November 23, 1944. The submarine remained submerged about 900 meters from the mouth of the Santiago Cove as it waited for nighttime to unload its cargo and passengers. At 5:55 p.m. Gar surfaced and moved closer to the cove. Barnett was already at hand, ready to start unloading.
USS Gar landed in Santiago Cove
In the “Calendar of Submarine Shipments to the Philippines” from the US Navy Operational Archives in Washington, DC, it is recorded that on November 23, 1944, the Gar under Lieutenant Commander Maurice “Duke” Ferrara, in “Santiago Cove, Wcoast Luzon landed 16 men and 25 tons of supplies; picked up docs [Roscoe 518].”
The following were the men who came with USS Gar: Capt FH Behan, Capt DV Jamison, T/Sgt LO Guzman, S/Sgt CB Maplia, Cpl LC Clemente, Cpl F Bermudes, S/Sgt A Villanueva, Sgt MQ Arellano, Sgt BC Alvez, Cpl Demetrio G Madrano, Cpl AA Pabros, Sgt WH Lowe, S/Sgt AB de la Pena, Capt WA Farrell, Sgt JC Bierley, Capt WD Vaughn.
By 10:00 p.m., the unloading was completed; Gar’s second mission was accomplished.
“The news of the successful submarine contact,” Volckman wrote in We Remained, “and the positive proof of it in the form of equipment from the outside . . . was a stimulus to civilians and guerillas alike. Almost overnight new spirit and greater determination were evident everywhere.”
In the logs of the Gar’s fifteenth and final war patrol in December 1944, wherein the submarine again brought cargo for USAFIP-NL, this time in Darigayos, and picked up “valuable intelligence information and documents” again in Santiago Cove, they noted that the latter mission was challenging partly because “[from] our previous mission there we know that the Japs had four small patrol vessels at San Esteban, 4 miles to the north of Santiago Cove, whose purpose was to prevent landings such as these.” It was even noted in their December 12, 1944 log that a small ship about five miles away could be seen while they were in Santiago Cove, and that it was “believed to be one of the patrol boats from San Esteban.” Certain that they were sighted, Ferrara, the submarine commander, stated that “Santiago Cove must now be considered completely compromised for missions of this nature.”
Among the sources that claim that the landing did occur in San Esteban is the “After-Battle Report: United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon Operations,” submitted by Volckmann to the Commanding General of the Army Forces Western Pacific on November 10, 1945, and the book Guerrilla Days in Northern Luzon, published by the USAFIP-NL in July 1946. The latter in fact first calls the alternative landing site as “San Sebastian, Ilocos Sur.”
The claim that the landing happened in San Esteban appears to be an error committed by Col. Volckmann; comparing Volckmann’s and the 1946 USAFIP-NL’s accounts with the Gar logs and the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center memorandum, Volckmann also erred in the weight of the cargo carried by the Gar for USAFIP-NL (it was 30, not 20). Both the After-Battle Report and Guerrilla Days also misspell Vaughan as Vaughn, suggesting that the San Esteban marker relied mainly on erroneous Volckmann-authored or Volckmann-derived sources (including Volckmann’s earlier autobiography We Remained: Three Years Behind Enemy Lines in the Philippines, published in the US in 1954).
A correction of sorts can be found in Murphy’s biography, which describes the November 1944 landing, but makes clear that it happened in Santiago Cove. And as mentioned above, records of Volckmann’s communication with SWPA clearly indicate Santiago Cove.
No direct link between Marcos and the USS Gar
In pro-Marcos propaganda about Ferdinand Sr.’s war-time exploits, there is no direct link between Marcos and the USS Gar, save in one instance. In his commissioned autobiography, For Every Tear a Victory: Marcos of the Philippines (1964), written by American Hartzell Spence, there is a line in the book’s second chapter implying that Marcos was physically present in Ilocos Sur during the November landing: “Late in 1944 Marcos. . . made contact on a storm-swept beach one night with a United States submarine, which landed a demolition expert, Captain Jamieson, and supplies with which Marcos’ command was to blow up the mountain roads and impede the Japanese withdrawal north of Manila.” This line was reproduced in subsequent (1969, 1979) editions of the biography. The “Captain Jamieson” mentioned almost certainly refers to Donald V. Jamison, unquestionably one of the Gar commandos.
But For Every Tear contradicts itself more than half a dozen chapters later, firmly placing Marcos in Pangasinan during the November landing. This is corroborated by both pro-Marcos and more impartial sources. The very title of the book Ferdinand E. Marcos: 77 Days in Eastern Pangasinan, produced by the Philippine Constabulary Historical Committee in 1982, indicates where, in military-approved narratives, Marcos was between August and early December 1944. The two editions of Marcos: The War Years, co-authored by Cesar T. Mella, who was affiliated with the government think-tank called the President’s Center for Special Studies, and Gracianus R. Reyes, reassert that from Bulacan, aboard a “charcoal-fed chevy car” in September 1944, he proceeded to “Urdaneta. . . thence to Asingan, thence to Tayug and finally to Natividad,” all in Pangasinan, staying in the last town until December.
According to Murphy’s biography, when Marcos showed up at the 5th District USAFIP-NL camp in Isabela between late November-December 1944, the camp’s commander, Col. Romulo Manriquez, did not know what to do with him, asking Murphy for advice. Marcos had claimed that he “had been sent by General Manuel Roxas to make arrangements to supply arms to the North Luzon guerrillas.”
Marcos was also asking where First Lady Esperanza Osmeña was. On October 30, 1944, ten days after then Commonwealth President Sergio Osmeña landed with Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Leyte, on the first lady’s insistence—fearing that they would be taken hostage to Japan— Volckmann’s command rescued her and her family from Baguio. Until they rejoined President Osmeña in Dagupan in January 1945, their whereabouts must be kept a secret.
Murphy assumed Marcos was a spy and suggested a means of eliminating him. Marcos was purportedly saved by the intervention of USAFIP-NL’s G-3 (Army Operations), Col. Calixto Duque, who was familiar with Marcos’s family. Volckmann reversed Murphy’s order to eliminate Marcos, and Murphy ordered Manriquez to allow Marcos’s attachment to the 14th Infantry, but only if he was “kept under close watch.” Another version of this story, though much less flattering to Murphy, is told in For Every Tear.
Besides For Every Tear, the most prominent book linking Marcos with the USS Gar—and only tenuously, to be very charitable—is a book by Prudencio R. Europa with the kilometric title, A Warrior’s Rendezvous with Destiny: The Filipino Soldier Dispossessed: True Story of Ferdinand E. Marcos; U.S. Submarine’s Missions Enable Luzon Guerrillas to Beat Japanese. The book was published in September 1989, shortly before Marcos’s death. Europa was, according to the book’s brief biographical note, a “newspaperman from the Deep North”—born in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur in fact—who had “followed the Marcos career” since Marcos first term in Congress (1949-1951), becoming Press Counsellor of the Embassy of the Philippines in the US in 1983.
Figure 5. Prudencio R. Europa’s A Warrior’s Rendezvous with Destiny (1989).
Based on the acknowledgements section of Europa’s book, what he really wanted to write initially was an account solely about the purported landing of the Gar in his hometown, but it was “[the] ill-treatment of the Filipino Soldier and the martyrdom of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos” [that] spurred [him] to go into publication.” The result is a volume (more than half of which is appendixes and pictures) that, as its title suggests, is partly a defense of Ferdinand Marcos’s war record, and partly an unconnected narrative about the Gar.
Europa listed among his sources, besides Jamison and another Gar commando, “elders of Barrio Apatot in San Esteban” who “gave recollections of that submarine landing.” He also evidently read and discussed the contents of the Gar’s fourteenth and fifteenth war patrol reports, quoting from them verbatim. Importantly, however, he misrepresented them by claiming these archival sources state that the November landing and unloading happened in San Esteban, not Santiago Cove. Nor does he state that based on those war patrol accounts, San Esteban was actually highlighted as a place to avoid for submarine landings.
Others who had read these records were more honest. In citing the logs of the Gar‘s fourteenth war patrol, Generoso Salazar, Fernando Reyes, and Leonardo Nuval, in their 1992 book World War II in North Luzon, Philippines, 1941-1945, make clear that the Gar surfaced off of Santiago Cove in November 1944.
Europa claimed that those who disembarked from the Gar in the evening of November 23, 1944 were met by members of the Women’s Auxiliary Service of the 121st Infantry. Though he does not name a source for this, it does affirm that only members of the 121st Infantry, which Marcos was never a part of, met with the Gar’s passengers. Guerrilla Days further affirms this, stating that “[the] 121st Infantry was instrumental in making contact with the submarine that landed arms, ammunitions and supplies for USAFIP, NL in November of 1944, and in bringing them to GHQ [General Headquarters], USAFIP, NL.” Guerrilla Days further states that in all of the submarine landings in November-December 1944 (the Gar made another landing, this time in Darigayos, La Union, in early December 1944), “the men of the 121st Infantry played an important part,” being the ones who “carried the supplies up mountain trails to General Headquarters of the USAFIP, NL for proper distribution to the field.”
The only time Europa mentioned Marcos as being connected to the Gar was when the president attended the San Esteban marker’s inauguration in December 1982.
Moreover, neither Marcos nor Jamison mentions the former’s presence during the November landing in other statements that they authored. Marcos does not mention it in “Ang Mga Maharlika – Its History in Brief,” one of the documents he submitted to the United States Army when he was attempting (unsuccessfully) to have the fictitious exploits of his Ang Mga Maharlika guerrilla unit recognized. Jamison, in an affidavit executed in Manila on December 31, 1982, claims that he worked closely with Marcos only while the former was attached to the 14th Infantry, specifically between January and March 1945.
Even the service record of Marcos, issued by the GHQ of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on March 4, 1996, which is included in the decidedly pro-Marcos document compilation titled Let the Marcos Truth Prevail, states that Marcos only attained the rank of major when he became affiliated with the 14th Infantry on December 12, 1944, after the Gar landings. Not a shred of credible evidence places a Major Ferdinand Marcos under the command of Volckmann before December 1944.
What then accounts for the last line of the San Esteban marker (“By order of Volckmann, Jamison and Maj. Ferdinand E. Marcos sneaked through the cordon of Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita to an air strip in Isabela and flew to Camp Spencer”)? After thoroughly going through related pro-Marcos propaganda, it becomes clear that that line is based on a story popularized by For Every Tear that has nothing to do with the landing. Reading the marker alone, one would think that immediately after the November 1944 landing, Marcos guided Jamison through enemy territory to Camp Spencer. But Spence says this perilous trek occurred in April 1945, when both Marcos and Jamison were attached to the 14th Infantry of USAFIP-NL.
All-out propaganda
Why did the NHI deem it necessary to mention Marcos in the “San Esteban Landing” marker, if his only “connection” was an excursion with one of the Gar’s passengers several months after the landing? Some context may be helpful. In December 1982, opposition newspaper We Forum was shut down and its publisher-editor, Jose Burgos, was arrested. The paper was charged with subversion, or “conspiracy to overthrow the government through black political propaganda, agitation and advocacy of violence” because it purportedly wanted to “discredit, insult and ridicule the president to such an extent that it would inspire his assassination,” as evidenced by its publication in November 1982 of a series of articles by Bonifacio Gillego that debunked several claims about Marcos’s wartime heroism. For the same series of articles, Burgos was charged by Marcos-allied veterans with libel, not on behalf of Marcos specifically, but of all soldiers of the Philippines. Jamison’s affidavit was executed in support of Marcos’s wartime record; he testified during the preliminary investigation for the libel case in January 1983 (that case did not go beyond the PI, while the subversion case was eventually dismissed). Presumably, the historical marker, inaugurated by Marcos shortly after We Forum’s office was raided and padlocked, and a little over a week after Burgos was released on house arrest, was also connected to this propaganda effort.
Another Gar passenger who executed an affidavit in December 1982 in favor of Marcos was Larry O. Guzman, an American citizen who was born in San Esteban. Guzman’s affidavit, also included in Europa’s book, hews very closely to Jamison’s, and affirms that they met Marcos only when they were all together with the 14th Infantry, well after the landing.
Jamison and Guzman, along with USS Gar commander Ferrara and another commando, Maj. Fred Behan, were conferred “the nation’s most distinguished military awards” by Marcos on January 4, 1983, a few days after the San Esteban marker inauguration. Marcos had also conferred at least three awards to his friends Jamison and Guzman since the former became president (a February 1984 article in The Filipino American states that these were “the Gold Cross Medal, distinguished Conduct Star, and Outstanding Award Medal.”).
Though Jamison’s and Guzman’s role in helping to hasten the defeat of the occupying Japanese forces are unquestionable, their claims about their comrade Marcos deserve scrutiny. In their affidavits, Jamison and Guzman assert that Marcos was always consulted on intelligence and combat ops, and even led demolition missions and heroically engaged enemy combatants. Official records of the 14th Infantry, USAFIP-NL, show that Marcos was designated regimental S-5, or civil affairs officer, at the time of the 1945 combat engagements involving Marcos that Jamison and Guzman supposedly witnessed. A compilation of 14th Infantry correspondences among the Philippine Archives Collection of the US National Archives shows the kind of work Marcos actually did at that time; the subject of the letter, dated February 8, 1945, was “Property Damaged, Burnt or Destroyed,” and it was a comment on a fragmentary report, not based on his own observations. Another letter, by a Captain Juan. Ma. Sabalburo of the 14th Infantry, dated 15 January 1945, talks about the letter writer’s trial (presumably a court martial), which is being handled by a Lt. Manaois and Major Ferdinand Marcos.
In one reconstructed roster of the 14th Infantry, which is among the documents submitted for the unit’s recognition by the US Army, Marcos is listed as a major who became a member of the unit on December 12, 1944, and toward the war’s end was assigned to the unit’s headquarters. In Guerrilla Days, an appended station list includes Major Marcos (misspelled “Farcos, Ferdinand”), assigned to serve as Assistant Adjutant General, which meant that he was principally an administrative officer. This is further affirmed in Col. Murphy’s biography, wherein Marcos is described as having served as a “civil affairs officer,” attached to headquarters until the war concluded. Finally, one of Gillego’s We Forum articles—which cites information from sources such as Capt. Vicente Rivera, staff and line officer of the 14th Infantry—mentions that by May to June 1945, Marcos was “in the relative safety of USAFIP, NL headquarters,” away from the Battle of Bessang Pass, which he allegedly participated in.
A book of lies
To reiterate: there is no link between Marcos and the landing of the USS Gar in Ilocos Sur in November 1944, besides an outright lie and a claim of an adventure with one of the Gar commandos, which is contrary to official records and communications, both of which are found in a notoriously unreliable and self-contradicting source: Spence’s For Every Tear a Victory.
For Every Tear starts with a falsehood: “Ferdinand Edralin Marcos was in such a hurry to be born that his father, who was only eighteen years old himself, had to act as midwife.” Mariano Marcos was several months over twenty years old when Ferdinand Sr. was born.
Besides false stories about Marcos’s wartime activities, the book is also responsible for propagating the lie that Marcos had the highest bar exam result in history, but had his score reduced by the bar examiners.
Moreover, the most authoritative sources on the matter show that there should not even be a marker on the November Gar landing in San Esteban, let alone one that unnecessarily mentions Marcos. Curiously, the online National Registry of Historic Sites and Structures of the Philippines does not include the San Esteban Landing marker, either among still existing sites and structures or those that had been delisted or otherwise removed. Given the evidence presented here, NHCP may intervene, invoking one of the mandates of the Commission stated in Republic Act no. 10086: “actively [engaging] in the settlement or resolution of controversies or issues relative to historical personages, places, dates and events.”
Even the Department of Tourism can take an interest in the matter, given that because of Republic Act no. 11408, Santiago Cove is officially a “tourist destination”; as such, its “development shall be prioritized” by the DOT. Emphasizing the place of Santiago Cove in the liberation of the Philippines would likely help boost tourism there. Consider that there is already a marker to the landing in Santiago Cove, though one without the NHI/NCHP’s imprimatur.
Devoid of historical basis, the monument is an addition to a growing list of permanent memorialization of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. unveiled after his remains were reinterred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani in 2016. The list includes the NHCP historical marker placed in 2017 under a repositioned statue in Batac, Ilocos Norte; a bronze statue of Marcos erected in Banna, Ilocos Norte sometime in 2019; a statue of Marcos in Paniqui, Tarlac, which was installed in August 2019; and new commemorative marker at the Pantabangan Dam in Nueva Ecija, which features a huge portrait of Marcos.
It was an April Fools’ day story that played out in the pages of the Bangkok Post 50 years ago, but the ending lies buried among the papers that the Marcos family left behind when they fled Malacañang in 1986.
It was a farce where the dictator, Ferdinand E. Marcos, put to work government officials and members of the country’s diplomatic corps to refute what was already an open secret: his sexual dalliance with American actress Dovie Beams.
Figure 1. Details of Dovie Beam’s picture from Hermie Rotea’s Marcos’ Lovey Dovey as posted by the Human Rights Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission.
There were three items related to the Philippines in the April 1, 1973 issue of the Bangkok Post. On page 14 was a whole-page profile of Marcos written by the editor-in-chief, Theh Chongkhadikij, with a sidebar on how Filipinos were faring under martial law. So far so good, Chongkhadikij reported, calling Marcos “a deep thinker with fair visions.” Just a page over was a report on Manila’s burgeoning underground press, “reflecting the Filipino’s frustration with stringent press controls after (the) declaration of martial law.”
The Dobbie Beams story
But what would get Malacañang’s goat was an article on the last page with the headline, “Actress Promises Raw Intimacies, Lurid Facts of Oriental Love.” Written by Gerry Coffey, it recounted the supposed efforts of “American actress Dobbie Beams” to publicize in Thailand an upcoming book on her “tempestuous affair” with Marcos.
The piece was accompanied by a picture of a woman, who could have been the real actress, posing as the “Dobbie Beams” that Coffey was referring to in her piece. It hewed so close to tales about the philandering president —as close as Dobbie to Dovie or Dovey— that the bricolage Coffey wrote could have been, to the humorless, mistaken for a report on an actual sex and political scandal.
Later, Coffey would describe her piece as an April Fools’ gag.
In the article, Coffey made it appear that “Dobbie Beams” was doing a promotional tour of the imaginary book in Bangkok “because of its importance in the Southeast Asia region and the impact of her story on the lives of the Asian people.” It seemed a subtle way of saying that the whole region was already in on the gossip about the Marcos-Beams affair — at a time when the president was trying to project his nearly seven month-old martial rule as a steadying factor in the Philippines and a welcome development in Southeast Asia.
By this time, the Bangkok Post had already earned Marcos’s ire when the newspaper published a three-part series, from February 21-23, 1973, of the scathing condemnation of the Marcos regime by Ninoy Aquino, the dictator’s arch political rival. The Aquino Papers, which were smuggled out of the former senator’s prison cell, forced Marcos to answer the tirade with an 8,000-word cable to the Bangkok Post, which the broadsheet also published.
Coffey, who had press access to Marcos and his wife, Imelda, at least twice before, had caricatured the first lady for a bizarre denial of her husband’s alleged long-time affair with Beams.
The incident was obviously preying on the mind of Mrs. Marcos too, for when I interviewed her, she seemed compelled to mention it although I would never have broached the subject myself.
She decried the villainous smear on her husband’s morals and said that their ambitious enemies would stop at nothing to lower her husband’s image in the eyes of the country.
The tape recording, which allegedly had been hooked up under a bed during a clandestine meeting between the President and Miss Beams, reportedly has President Marcos whispering sweet nothings, singing love songs, and reciting poetry.
In actual fact, said Mrs. Marcos, tears threatening to spill down her cheeks, it is an imitation of her husband’s voice taken from his many campaign speeches. The singing, she admitted, is actually that of her husband’s, but any Filipino would immediately recognize that he is singing the national marching anthem—hardly a love song.
Marcos’s men were quick to sense the damaging implications of Coffey’s attempt at humor at the expense of the first couple.
Cleaning up the mess
Four days after April Fool’s day when Coffey’s article came out, the Malaysian newspaper Berita Harian carried an article about Manuel Yan, Philippine ambassador to Thailand, lodging a diplomatic protest at the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of the Bangkok Post’s “false story”.
Why Yan, still under 10 months in his posting in Thailand, thought a formal protest was a proportional response to Coffey’s article is unclear. He had a long and distinguished military career, capped by an almost four-year stint as the youngest chief of staff of the Armed Forces at 48. Yan’s diplomatic assignment, however, was largely seen as a way of easing him out from the president’s inner circle for publicly saying that Marcos had no clear reason to impose martial law.
In a June 14, 1973 personal and confidential letter to Marcos, Yan mentioned another letter he wrote to the president on April 6 that same year “regarding the April Fools’ gag story on Dovie Beams which appeared on ‘The Bangkok Post’ issue of April 1st.”
At least, the envoy had brought the matter directly to Marcos. Unlike Gen. Fabian Ver, then commanding general of the Presidential Security Command, who only mentioned Chongkhadikij’s profile of the president in an April 11 letter to Marcos. Of the four pages (13, 14, 15, 16) of the Bangkok Post that Ver had attached to his letter, none had Coffey’s piece which was on page 20.
Was Ver, ever the loyal and solicitous Marcos henchman, trying to shield the president from Coffey’s dark humor? But Ver was neck-deep in the whole Marcos-Beams affair, arranging the lovers’ trysts.
Figure 2. Amb. Manuel Yan’s June 14, 1973 letter to Pres. Ferdinand Marcos bearing Gerry Coffey’s apology to the First Couple.
Yan’s June 14 letter, carried the desired ending to the Coffey story: an apology. Three months after publication of her article, Marcos’s diplomatic agents got the apology from Coffey.
“It was a spur of the moment idea for an April Fool joke and I was called to the States on an emergency before I had the time to reflect on the seriousness of the article,” Coffey explained in a June 12, 1973 letter to Ferdinand and Imelda.
“On the long journey home,” she continued, “I realized that besides being grossly inconsiderate of you and your wife, I violated my own sense of journalistice [sic] ethics by catering to the lower tastes of the reading public.”
“It wasn’t until General (Carlos) Romulo’s visit however, that I realized the embarrassment it caused you and your government, and I bitterly regret that,” Coffey finally wrote.
The visit she was referring to, based on the Foreign Service Institute publication Philippine Diplomacy: Chronology and Documents, 1972-1981, is likely the one that took place on April 13-21, 1973. Romulo, as foreign affairs secretary, attended the Sixth ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Pattaya, southeast of Bangkok.
There is no indication that Coffey wanted her apology to be published or for the joke to be spelled out for everyone, and no one in Marcos’s propaganda corps probably felt the need to bring up Beams again in the state-controlled press in the Philippines.
In her apology, Coffey stated, “As the material about Dovie Beams had been given previous publicity in magazine and newspapers, including my own paper [referring either to the Post or the now defunct Bangkok World, where she served as “women’s editor”], I did not consider the seriousness of alluding to her presence in Bangkok.”
The real Dovie Beams affair
By the time Marcos received Coffey’s letter, he had been “dealing with” Beams for a little over four years.
Well before the actress became a household name in the Philippines, Marcos’ penchant for women was already an open secret. As has been detailed before, Imelda wasn’t even the first “Mrs. Marcos”; the story of Carmen Ortega was already well-disseminated by 1969, thanks to Carmen Navarro Pedrosa’s The Untold Story of Imelda Marcos.
That same year, news of an alleged affair between Marcos and the wife of a United States Navy made the rounds among American diplomats, as reported by Jack Anderson in an article carried by newspapers such as the Indiana Gazette and the Great Bend Tribune in September.
Former U.S. Embassy Consul General Lewis Gleeck Jr. wrote in his book President Marcos and the Philippine Political Culture that it was not actually a naval officer’s wife. He said the “actual offended party [was] bent on making a public scandal,” but was dissuaded after getting a “stern lecture” on the dignity of the Office of the President by Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor.
“There is no doubt that Ferdinand, to put it vulgarly, screwed around,” James Hamilton-Paterson wrote in America’s Boy, adding that “there is reason for thinking that mere sexual encounters were not by any means the only thing he wanted, and it was the emotional seriousness of his unexpected relationship with Dovie Beams that caused all the problems.”
Between late 1968 and early 1969, Beams was cast as one of the leads in the film Maharlika, an American-Philippine co-production based on Marcos’s war years. According to Beams, as relayed by Hermie Rotea in his book Marcos’ Lovey Dovie, her travel to the Philippines was arranged by Marcos crony Potenciano “Nanoy” Ilusorio as the movie was filmed on location.
But Maharlika was never publicly screened anywhere save in Guam, where an unfinished version had a brief theatrical run in August 1970. A bootleg version appeared in the 1980s, retitled Guerrilla Strike Force.
It is unclear when the decision to shelve the film was made. Letters purportedly from Beams, dated October 29 and November 6, 1970 and currently in the custody of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, state that it was she who asked the Philippine production company to stop the film from being shown as it was still unfinished and she had not been fully compensated. After Maharlika’s screenings in Guam, Beams was described in American newspapers, including The Los Angeles Times, as the head of the Manila-based production firm Creativity Films, and was casting for a film titled Aftermath.
It was on November 11, 1970 that Beams rose to infamy. In a press conference at the Bayview hotel in Manila, she divulged the details of her torrid affair with Marcos and played a snippet of one of their secretly recorded sexual encounters.
According to scholar Caroline Hau, “[the] airing of Marcos’s bedroom antics—from the most intimate of conversations to the most intimate of acts—exposed him to public hilarity and humiliation, effectively chipping away at his own carefully crafted public persona as devoted husband and heroic statesman.”
Washington naturally was concerned. Telegrams were sent from the U.S. embassy in Manila, then headed by Ambassador Henry Byroade, on Beams’s disclosures and movements. Shortly after her press conference, the actress was escorted out of the country by American consul Lawrence Harris, with immigration associate commissioner Victor Nituda, several other immigration officers, and press secretary Francisco Tatad.
Philippine officials made clear that Beams was not being deported; in a November 14, 1970 article titled “No Pressure, Miss Beams,” in Guam’s Pacific Daily News, the actress said she had been “assured by immigration authorities that she could come back anytime she wanted.”
At least that was what the Philippine News Service stressed.
There is no record of Beams ever returning to the Philippines. Her prospects of coming back were likely further dimmed after a failed assassination attempt in Hong Kong a few days after she left the Philippines. Former Hong Kong Standard editor Kevin Sinclair recalled witnessing a standoff between local police and “five killers with Philippine diplomatic passports” at the hotel where Beams was staying.
Seeing the impact of the Beams revelations on Marcos’s image, his regime’s diplomatic corps in the U.S. was put to work in an effort to dig up dirt on the private life of the American actress. In a cable sent from the Philippines Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York to acting foreign secretary Manuel Collantes dated November 30, 1970, Romulo relayed privileged information about Beams from birth statistics records of the Department of Public Health of Nashville, Tennessee (revealing that she was older than she claimed) and records of the Fourth Circuit Court Clerk’s Office detailing her divorce from her ex-husband Edward Boehms.
The divorce papers included a report from psychiatrist Dr. Henry B. Brackin, who diagnosed Beams with “anxiety hysteria with schisoid (sic) traits, a poorly integrated personality, extremely narcissistic, suffering from illusions and possible hallucinations.”
Figure 3. Foreign Affairs Sec. Carlos P. Romulo’s cable to Manuel Collantes, November 30, 1970.
Romulo emphasized that the information was “top secret” and only for the eyes of Nicasio Valderrama, then first secretary and press officer of the Philippines Permanent Mission to the UN. Still, the information in Romulo’s letter made national news.
In a December 10, 1970 diary entry, Marcos wrote that Roberto Benedicto, Juan Ponce Enrile, and Supreme Court justices Antonio Barredo and Claudio Teehankee “all agree that [their] idea of filing a case of blackmail or libel” against Beams was “not wise” and “recommend[ed] that we meet the Dovie Boehms attack with silence and not descend to her level.”
By January 1971, Marcos seemed to have weathered the crisis. According to a Memorandum of Conversation detailing a meeting of U.S. President Richard Nixon with Ambassador Byroade, and diplomat John H. Holdridge,
[Nixon] wanted to know how Marcos was getting along with respect to the Dovey Beams case. [Byroade] said that the case hadn’t really caused Marcos all that much difficulty, since Philippine mores were quite different from our own. The only criticism of Marcos appeared to be over the fact that he got caught out. Whatever he did, he shouldn’t have let Miss Beams make tapes of his liaison. According to [Byroade], Miss Beams was still trying to keep something of a hold over Marcos.
But a few months later, in a March 12, 1971 entry, Marcos wrote that he had directed Potenciano “Nanoy” Ilusorio to “push through the extortion case against Dovie Beams who is still intimidating everyone by false publications, this time in the Detroit Free Press.” In an article in that newspaper on February 28, 1971 with the headline “The Scary World of One Dovie Beams,” the actress said she turned down a $2 million bribe to stop talking about her affair with Marcos. An article in Government Report, a publication of the National Media Production Center, dated May 10, 1971 confirmed that a case against Beams for blackmail was “pending in the Pasig court of first instance.”
It is not known if the case was ever dropped.
Alongside the blackmail case, a character assassination project also took its course in print. As recalled in Hermie Rotea’s Lovey Dovie, the magazine Republic Weekly, a known Marcos publication, released a 10-part series on Beams entitled “The Real Story” which ran from February 26 to April 30, 1971.
Each story, accompanied by nude photographs of Beams, painted her as “an obscure Hollywood bit player who had come to Manila to extort money from President Marcos and from certain businessmen who claim to be close to the President.” A certain “A.E.,” the anonymous contributor who wrote the series, described the love affair as “a figment of Dovie’s imagination,” and detailed her alleged psychiatric diagnosis. Referencing the divorce proceedings earlier alluded to by Romulo, “A.E.” proceeded with a malicious description of Beams’s supposed past.
In 1971, Maharlika was shelved indefinitely on orders of the first lady. In a letter to Imelda dated November 10, 1980, producer Luis Nepomuceno stated that the first lady had entrusted to him “the responsibility of safeguarding the film [Maharlika] which we shelved from exhibition.”
Two years later, Beams said she would reveal details of her love affair with Marcos in a forthcoming book entitled Dovie Beams by Me. She made the announcement in a March 11, 1973 Parade magazine article that featured a picture of her with Marcos autographed by the president. Parade was distributed by hundreds of newspapers across the U.S.
But the tell-all book Beams kept saying she was writing was never released. Rotea’s Lovey Dovie was released in 1983 and is the only book-length treatment of the Dovie Beams affair. It includes information the author gathered from “marathon” interviews with Beams in Beverly Hills in 1973, transcripts of some of the recorded lovemaking sessions, and small unreadable reproductions of the Republic Weekly series where one can make out Beams’s “X-rated” photos.
There is no way of knowing if Marcos still cared about the issue from 1973 onward. There is no mention of the Dobbie-Coffey fiasco in Marcos’s diary entries between April and June 1973. However, various accounts — such as Pedrosa’s Imelda Romualdez Marcos: The Verdict and Beth Day Romulo’s Inside the Palace — claim that Imelda never forgot.
The other women
If their marriage had become more professional than romantic by the time Beams first made her disclosures, Ferdinand and Imelda didn’t show it. Instead, there were public displays of affection, lavish birthday and wedding anniversary celebrations complete with infrastructural “gifts,” and repeated allusions to him as Malakas and her as Maganda.
It was all a hoax, of course.
Documents on the transfer of ill-gotten funds from the Swiss bank accounts of the Marcoses to the Philippine treasury show that among the beneficiaries of the couple’s “foundations” were two women: Evelin Hegyesi in Sidney, Australia and Anita Langheinz in Vienna, Austria.
It remains unclear who Langheinz is, but Hegyesi, a model whose photos appeared in Playboy and Australian dailies and weeklies, is now best known as the mother of President Bongbong Marcos’s alleged half sister, Analisa Josefa (as in Josefa Marcos, the late dictator’s mother). Analisa was reportedly born in April 1971— five months after Beams left the Philippines and two years before Coffey’s article came out.
Figure 4. Marcos’s Order to Vibur Foundation to Release Funds to Evelin Hegyesi and an Anita Langheinz 1982.Figure 4. Order to Vibur Foundation, Deposits to Hegyesi and Langheinz, 1985
A February 1982 order from Marcos, in his “capacity as first beneficiary,” to the Board of Trustees of the Vibur Foundation, directed the “distribution” of Australian $3,000 a month to Hegyesi and U.S. $1,000 also monthly on his behalf.
Hegyesi’s deposits were to start on April 1, 1982, but the order was no April Fools’ joke.
In fact, it included a remittance of Australian $10,000 to Hegyesi “upon receipt of this letter.” Marcos amended his order in 1985 stating that beginning June of that year, Langheinz was to receive U.S. $2,000 per month and Hegyesi, Australian $5,000.
Coffey’s prank article stated that Dobbie Beams met Marcos through a “fast-rising former senator of the Philippines who allegedly lost favor with the First Lady because of his unlimited supply of young beautiful starlets who were placed at the beck and call of government officials.”
Clearly, as with all jokes, Coffey’s April Fool piece had a grain of truth in it —or better yet, an entire sackful mixed with crystalline crap.
Tomorrow, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. becomes the 17th president of the Republic of the Philippines.
Many of the so-called Marcos loyalists are, of course, ecstatic. Two of them, businessperson Serafia “Cherry” Cobarrubias and broadcaster/writer Rita Gadi, shared their joy—and pro-Marcos propaganda—on the livestreamed program of the latter, The Rita Gadi Hour, a few weeks after the May 9 elections.
Cobarrubias, who reportedly helped fund the December 1989 coup attempt against Corazon Aquino, insisted that Bongbong’s win was a miracle; that “the voice of God is the voice of the people”; and that members of the clergy who spoke against Bongbong should be ashamed of themselves and ask for forgiveness. Gadi, Marcos regime propagandist, insisted that there is no evidence that Marcos Sr.’s wealth came from the state’s coffers. Near the end of the livestream, Cobarrubias claimed that the former dictator, on his deathbed, said that only 3% of his wealth would be kept for his family and the rest of his assets worldwide “should go to the Filipino people.”
Rita Gadi and Cherry Cobarrubias, screencap from the Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino YouTube channel
It seems safe to say, at least based on social media, that some who voted for Bongbong did so based on these claims, including the narrative that the family’s wealth would be used for the benefit of the entire country should a Marcos reoccupy Malacañang. Many loyalists believe that promise that was often repeated by Bongbong’s mother, Imelda.
Documents, however, show that Marcos Sr. himself never made such a pledge. At best, he set up the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) that did appear to serve a charitable purpose, in contrast to several other Marcos “foundations” that clearly functioned to help the family retain wealth that is far beyond what they could have legally earned. Ambiguous claims regarding FEMF’s funding sources and purpose became a basis for the Marcos family’s improbable vow to share their wealth. Such distortion of the truth then mutated into the scams that further propagated the myth of bounty for loyalty to the Marcoses.
THE FERDINAND E. MARCOS FOUNDATION
In 1970, at the start of his second term as president, Marcos Sr. publicly announced that he was putting all of his wealth in a foundation bearing his name. In a statement, the chief executive said he was motivated by “the strongest desire and the purest will to set the example of self-denial and self-sacrifice for all [his] people.” Records of the Security and Exchange Commission show that FEMF filed its articles of incorporation and by-laws on January 21, 1970, but in her book Marcos Martial Law: Never Again, author Raissa Robles said that the foundation’ registration had already been revoked by 2015.
Information on the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation, Inc. from the SEC Express website
Marcos Sr.’s announcement made headlines even in foreign media, quoting his statement. A wire story published in the Miami Herald mentioned that in 1968, “Marcos was listed for the first time among the Philippines’ top 100 income taxpayers” with the equivalent of over $160,000 “mostly from legal fees earned before he became president in 1965” even though his annual salary” was only $15,000. A 2003 decision written by former chief justice Renato Corona noted that Marcos Sr.’s income tax return just before becoming president “did not show any receivables from client at all” and there were “no documents showing any withholding tax certificates.”
A Manila Bulletin article discussed in the Philippine Weekly Economic Review noted that Marcos Sr.’s “properties, savings and investments [were to] go to the people through a foundation which will be used to advance education, science, technology and the arts,” but “did not specify” which assets or if these included conjugal properties with Imelda. In his 1970 statement and other speeches, Marcos only said that “[provisions] will be made for [his] children, so that they shall be assured of satisfactory education and be prepared to meet their lifetime duties and endeavors.”
The first couple poured millions of dollars into their children’s education, money that courts have ruled could not have been legally obtained. Expenditures included tuition, allowances, housing, and donations. Neither of the two Marcos children, Imee and Bongbong, who studied in universities abroad obtained scholarships. Both returned home without a degree.
After Marcos was deposed in 1986, it became clear that besides the money spent on their children’s education, properties purchased abroad, deposits made in U.S. banks as early as 1968, funds in Swiss bank accounts determined to be illegally obtained, among others, were not among the assets of the FEMF. To reiterate, Marcos never stated outright that his countrymen would have a redeemable share in the wealth he purportedly donated to the Foundation.
The FEMF had its headquarters in the Goldenberg Mansion on 838 Gen Solano Street, San Miguel, Manila which was christened with the name “Ang Maharlika.” In a 1979 speech, Marcos Sr. said the mansion was “bought by the Marcos Foundation and converted into a guest house and then donated to the government,” but the property was listed in the 1979 Philippine Yearbook as the site of the Marcos Foundation Museum.
The Sandiganbayan declared in a partial summary judgment on December 19, 2019 that paintings found at the Goldenberg mansion were ill-gotten and were forfeited in favor of the government. It noted that the Marcos heirs admitted owning the paintings in the mansion and other locations that were valued at $23 million, more than the legitimate income of the Marcoses before they fled the country. A particular set of paintings by American artist Grandma Moses displayed at the Goldenberg Mansion was, according to a New York Times article, collectively purchased for more than $600,000, about twice the Court-declared legal earnings of Marcos Sr. and his wife in their last term in office.
A list of science foundations certified by the National Science Development board as of January 30, 1972 included the FEMF, which was described as a funder of “research studies on behavioral and social sciences and the humanities; scholarships; professorial chairs; publication and dissemination of results of research studies.” Perhaps its best known project was the UP Los Baños’s National Institute of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology for which FEMF committed P20 million for the purchase of laboratory furniture. A Supreme Court decision in 2004, however, pointed out that FEMF stopped paying the furniture supplier in early 1985 and its almost P1 million collectibles remained unpaid even after the fall of Marcos.
It appears that money from the Foundation was used for military research as well, although this is difficult to prove. An article published in April 1972 in the Far Eastern Economic Review mentioned that funding for the infamous Filipino-made missiles, one of which was nicknamed Bongbong, came “from the Marcos Foundation which the president said he would set up as his contribution to social amelioration.” It is unclear why no further progress was made in the local missile program beyond the first half of 1972.
Numerous government and non-state sources attest to the existence of FEMF-funded scholarships, but the number of scholars who benefitted from them appear to have been few. A Ministry of Education and Culture memorandum from April 1982 states that the Pangulo Scholarship Program was constituted by the Kabataang Barangay Foundation, Inc., and the FEMF in Oct. 1981. For the school year 1982-83, the program had 150 slots distributed in 13 regions. Pangulo scholars had to take one of five courses in six universities with “a monthly living yearly allowance of P5,000, excluding tuition and book allowance. In the 1986-87 academic year, slots for the Pangulo Scholarship slots were unlimited but students had to be active members of the Kabataang Barangay.
The name “Marcos Foundation” were in the copyright pages of numerous books purportedly written by Marcos Sr., many of which were distributed free. Studies have provided evidence that these books were in fact produced by ghostwriters and that at times, the money spent to publish came from government offers, not the FEMF. A statement of transactions in the files of the Presidential Commission on Good Government shows that the Foundation owed $31,120 to Prentice-Hall, Inc., publisher of “Marcos’s” book The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines, as of December 31, 1974.
Ghostwritten books published in the 1970s by the Marcos Foundation with resources from the National Media Production Center
The Foundation also attempted to fund a professorial chair at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Based on the February 1977 Official Month in Review published in the Official Gazette, the proposal to set up the chair was submitted to Marcos by Nihal W. Goonewardene, director of the Asia Pacific teaching fellowship program of Fletcher School based in Manila.” As reported by the Harvard Crimson, the FEMF had donated $500,000 to Tufts by January 1981 to establish the Ferdinand E. Marcos Chair for East Asian and Pacific Studies, and partly finance the construction of a school building. That same month, however, Marcos canceled the funding without withdrawing what had already been donated. Various explanations for this were given, but it was reported that numerous scholars declined the offer to fill the chair.
From these snippets, it is quite clear that the Foundation was well endowed, but there was no indication that it had sufficient assets to make every Filipino wealthy or significantly address the country’s economic deficits; it certainly did not help in paying the country’s foreign debt. Moreover, the known assets of the Foundation were dwarfed by the billions of dollars in the Marcoses’ ill-gotten assets kept separate from what the FEMF managed.
FERDINAND MARCOS’S LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
Not long after the EDSA Revolution, the PCGG focused on Marcos assets that were stashed abroad, in foundations that had the Marcoses as beneficiaries, or those kept for Marcos by dummies, some of which were recovered via compromise agreements. Based on the various versions of his last will and testament from 1980 to 1988, Marcos Sr. never had any other specified heirs besides his wife and children.
A portion of Marcos Sr.’s will from March 1982 was shown to journalists by his family in November 2016 to show what their patriarch said about his funeral and burial arrangements.
The PCGG has the full version of the will in its files and among the appendices of the book Marcos Legacy Revisited: Raiders of the Lost Gold by Erick San Juan, published in 1998. The portion not shown to the media contained details of his wealth that Marcos Sr. bequeathed entirely to his wife and their three children and adopted daughter Aimee. The FEMF is mentioned only as an executor in case of his wife’s “default or incapacity.” The will also contained this provision: “I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, or alleged to have been executed, signed, or published by me.”
If Marcos ever willed any of his assets to go to other people other than his only son and wife after his death prior to March 1982, he had effectively withdrawn it.
Note from Joaquin T. Venus, deputy presidential executive assistant of Ferdinand Marcos Sr., regarding a 1982 draft of his will, from the digitized files of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
That revocation clause (a standard feature of wills) was retained in another version of his will, made a month later. This one too appears in San Juan’s book and kept in PCGG’s files. The most glaring alteration in this version is the removal of the Marcos Foundation as secondary executor and in its place, Bongbong was designated as executor along with Imelda.
A 1988 version of Marcos’s will has been published at least twice: in the October 7, 1992 issue of the Manila Standard, which noted that the document had been “acknowledged” by Imelda, according to former senator Rene Saguisag; and in San Juan’s Raiders of the Lost Gold. Substantively,the will remained similar to its earlier incarnation, again naming Bongbong and Imelda as co-executors. Bongbong’s name was dropped in 1982 and reinstated in 1988. The 1988 will, or a later version of it, appears to have been Marcos Sr.’s last.
First page of a 1988 version of Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s last will and testament, as published in Erick San Juan’s book Marcos Legacy Revisited: Raiders of the Lost Gold
Ferdinand Sr. died on September 28, 1989. Despite the government’s attempts to disqualify them from performing their duties, the Supreme Court, in Republic v. Marcos II, affirmed that Bongbong and Imelda were the co-executors of Marcos Jr.’s will but this did not give either of them a say on what to do with the billions recovered by the PCGG.
FALSE PROMISES AND COMPROMISES
Not long after her husband’s death, Imelda began saying that she would use all of her family’s wealth for the benefit of the nation as supposedly intended by Marcos Sr. She said it in 1990 after she was acquitted of violating the U. S. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, mail fraud, and obstruction of justice and a year later, in a press conference on her return from exile. Imelda said she had wanted to release some of their money to support “typhoon victims, for earthquake victims, for [those affected by the eruption of Mt.] Pinatubo” but that “was not allowed.”
There is no known evidence to support this.
By that time, over five years had passed since the Swiss government had frozen the Marcos bank accounts in Switzerland after an attempted withdrawal of $200 million in deposits in March 1986, when the Marcoses were already in exile. When Imelda returned to the country, a settlement had been made in which the government would drop a civil racketeering case against the former first lady “in California and all other pending or future suits against her in U.S. courts in return for an estimated $8 million worth of Marcos property” in that country, the Washington Post had reported.
The settlement did not include the dropping of lawsuits filed by private individuals, some of which were successful.
By saying at that time that they needed permission to access funds for disaster relief, Imelda was practically stating that beyond what was discovered by various governments, the Marcoses had relatively little else. Indeed, even the P27 million in freshly minted bank notes that they “unintentionally exported” to Hawaii when they landed there in February 1986 were seized from them and partly returned to the Philippine government, already demonetized, in 1992.
Perhaps this was why she did not make the distribution of her family’s wealth a highlight in her 1992 presidential campaign. Her 15-point platform did not mention it, but some of her most important loyalists did it for her. Among them was writer/educator Reynaldo T. Fajardo, a founding member of the organizationFriends of Imelda Romualdez Marcos or FIRM, also known as FIRM-24K.
Fajardo wrote a number of pro-Marcos books in the late 1980s and the 1990s, including The Acquittal, Homecoming, and Inevitable Rise to the Presidency of Imelda Romualdez Marcos, published in 1991. In his book, Fajardo claimed that Marcos Sr. “wanted to use [his] stupendous wealth [purportedly hundreds of billions worth of gold] to turn the Philippines into a self-reliant and truly sovereign nation that would gain the respect of the rest of the world.” He added that in fact, Marcos Sr. “said that he was also sympathetic with the miserable plight of the other underdeveloped and developing countries” and “planned to help them, too.”
One can’t help but wonder why the former dictator did not do that when he was president.
Fajardo also said the “vast wealth that the late President accumulated and conserved” was intended to be used “to accomplish his vision for the country,” and that Imelda would “use effectively” this wealth “left with her by the President.”
Various pro-Marcos books – books by FIRM founding member Reynaldo Fajardo and the Katarungan and Katotohanan Foundation
Imelda would later echo this as a campaign promise. An article published in March 1998 in the Manila Standard with the headline “Imelda Reveals more Secret Bank Accounts,” stated that the Marcos widow, then a presidential candidate, claimed that her family had over $800 million “in secret bank accounts abroad that she would give to the poor Filipinos if she wins the May presidential election.” That amount supposedly excluded funds that were previously identified as ill-gotten in Swiss bank accounts. Imelda said that even she was “not aware of the extent of [their] wealth,” further claiming that her husband’s money was a product of “diligence, hard work, foresight, entrepreneurship and God’s blessing.”
The Standard reported that Imelda showed the press a photocopy of a purported handwritten will of Marcos Sr. stating that “his worldly goods have been placed in the custody and for the disposition of the Marcos foundations [sic] dedicated to the welfare of the Filipino people.” Another article, published in Sol Jose Vanzi’s Philippine Headline News Online on April 15, 2004, dates this alleged “handwritten legacy” as being executed on April 9, 1973.
If true, then the wills Marcos executed in the 1980 leaving all of his wealth to members of his immediate family, superseded the 1973 one.
Still, Imelda insisted her husband wanted to leave all his wealth to the people. In December 1998, months after she withdrew from the presidential race to support the eventual winner, Joseph Estrada, Imelda testified during a senate hearing that she wanted the chamber’s help to “implement the last will and testament of the late President Marcos, to enlist assets in the hands of trustees, to implement the Marcos Humanitarian Foundation, so that we can help the country in our economic crisis and help the Filipino people in their agony and suffering.”
Imelda made the appeal after claiming in a series of articles published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer that her family “practically [owned] everything in the Philippines.” During her 70th birthday a year later, before a cheering crowd in a church, she declared in Filipino that she was convinced Estrada would find a way to settle with the Marcoses and this would lead to the establishment of a Marcos Foundation to help the country.
In 2004, she and her children threw their support behind presidential candidate (and Estrada ally) Fernando Poe Jr., because, as per Imelda, “FPJ [will help implement] the last will of Ferdinand Marcos, which is to help the people even if he [Marcos] is already gone.” According to an April 2004 Philippine Daily Inquirer article, Imelda said “that if Poe won, the Marcoses would willingly give [their assets] to the government so he could use it for the people.”
Over time, Imelda’s claims became wilder becoming not only about distributing money, but also promising a stake for Filipinos in the fictitious deuterium deposits in the Philippine Deep.
These did not exactly jibe with statement made not only by her husband when was still alive but also those made by Bongbong, especially when the family wanted to make compromise agreements with the government. Before the Marcos patriarch died, according to various news accounts, the family, through alleged intermediaries, offered to give anywhere between $2.1 billion to $5 billion to the government so they could return to the Philippines. Former vice president Salvador Laurel maintained that the elder Marcos was willing to give 90% of his wealth which could have left the family $550 million.
But Marcos Sr. was a notoriously unreliable source regarding his wealth. In 1987, he was still outrightly denying that he had any Swiss bank accounts or hidden wealth. In the same year, in the infamous “Marcos Tapes” in which the exiled dictator was secretly recorded talking about a plan to invade the Philippines, Marcos Sr. mentioned that he had billions of U.S. dollars worth of gold, and that Bongbong knew where part of that hoard was. During a hearing on the Marcos tapes at the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, Representative Jim Leach said that the Marcos gold, “while representing a monstrous theft, cannot possibly be of such monumental proportions.”
For his part, Bongbong has repeatedly asserted that his father made his money partly by trading in precious metals although this has never been judicially acknowledged in the Philippines. More importantly, Bongbong deviated from his mother’s claims by insisting that compromising or sharing their wealth with the government was not a means to fulfill some philanthropic final wish of his father but a way for their family to be rid of their remaining cases in one fell swoop.
A November 2, 1997 article published in the Filipino Express stated that Bongbong, then on hiatus from politics after failing to win a senate seat in 1995, wanted to compromise only to give his family immunity. That was the whole point, he stated; “Kaya namin ginagawa ito para malinis na ang lahat, mawala na ang kaso, maayos na ang hatian sa alleged Marcos assets.” He also insisted that there was no more hidden wealth beyond what had already been identified in the frozen Swiss bank accounts. If anyone could find more, it’s theirs, he effectively said.
An earlier settlement try in 1993 was junked by the Philippine Supreme Court for several reasons, including the impossibility of granting the Marcoses immunity (since they were the principal defendants in numerous cases and would not stand as witness against other defendants) and the fact that then president, Fidel Ramos was not a signatory to the agreement between PCGG and the Marcoses.
By 1997, Ramos, with support from the majority of the senate, asked Congress for a law allowing him to enter into a compromise with the Marcoses following a proposal from Bongbong, according to an October 1997 South China Morning Post article. While the senate, based on a Manila Standard article published that same month, was willing to do that or provide, in the words of the late senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, a (limited) special power of attorney, it did not happen.
Soon after Estrada became president, he reiterated his campaign trail declaration that he wanted to give executive clemency to Imelda, but as reported in a January 1999 Xinhua News Agency article, the family must have a united voice. Perhaps Estrada noted the disconnect between Imelda’s claims of unfathomable wealth for the people and Bongbong’s more pragmatic stance. He was mainly talking to Bongbong and no agreement was reached.
Bongbong made it seem that it was only through a compromise that the government could get its hands on the Swiss funds, but a condition for the transfer of the money was a final judgment of conviction on the Marcoses. By the early 2000s, this had not been met technically but all that was really necessary for the transfer was the 2003 Supreme Court decision, written by Chief Justice Corona, declaring the wealth in excess of the Marcoses’ legitimate income as ill-gotten. By then, the funds had reached over $650 million.
THE BASIS OF LOYALIST LOYALTY?
While Bongbong’s ultimately unsuccessful attempts to reach a compromise with the government appealed to decision makers, especially those frustrated with a supposedly underperforming PCGG and the Marcoses’ legal maneuverings, it was Imelda’s more fantastic claims that drew many die-hard loyalists to the family’s side. FIRM 24-K would hold on to Imelda’s promise of wealth distribution even through the last decade, when their president, Artemio Lachica, claimed that the share of its members in the Marcos wealth would only be given once the Marcoses get what they are fighting for. Apparently, some FIRM 24-K’s members were promised a million pesos for participating in the organization’s tree-planting program where they had to pay for the seedlings, according to a 2022 article published in the Philippine Star after the elections.
There are other groups like FIRM 24-K. In a November 2017 Facebook post, popular pro-Marcos vlogger Maharlika said she was not connected to what she labeled a scammer group, Maharlika Marcos Loyalist, Inc., which, like FIRM 24-K, collected fees while promising to give money or wealth. Photo/video evidence show that this group, Inc. was among the organizers of Imelda’s ill-fated 90th birthday celebration in July 2019 at the Ynares Stadium in Pasig where hundreds suffered food poisoning.
Both groups are recognized by the Marcoses. One of FIRM 24-K’s Facebook pages uploaded twovideos showing that they can legitimately claim to have pushed Bongbong to run for national office again in the 2010 elections where he won a seat in the Senate, and another one that had Imelda pledging a P1 million seed fund to its “Anima Foundation.” Such Marcos-sanctioned groups have spun off into other organizations claiming to help give people a stake in the Marcos wealth but whose direct ties to the family, if any, are not readily apparent. An example is the scammer group Bullion Buyer Ltd., which organized an event in 2017 where thousands flocked to UP Los Baños to claim—unsuccessfully—a few thousand pesos allegedly from the Marcos’s coffers.
A pamphlet of Bullion Buyer Ltd. beside one of its key sources, a book distributed by Imelda Marcos
It is difficult to ascertain how many voted for Bongbong with the belief that he would pave the way for mass wealth distribution. Based on Google Trends, there was a spike in search interest on the late dictator’s last will and testament days after Bongbong’s win became a certainty. FIRM 24-K alone claims millions of members nationwide. The program at the UPLB event claimed that Bullion Buyer Ltd. already had over 281,000 beneficiaries. And no matter how many times these are debunked, sometimes by the Marcoses themselves, claims that the family would give away either a share in their “Tallano gold” or help people monetize their claims to “deuterium deposits” under a Bongbong Marcos presidency remain popular.
But what if this does not happen?
In 2002, according to a November 10 Inquirer article, several long-time loyalists claimed that they were severing ties with the Marcos widow — and preparing a book that would show the “real Imelda”— after it was said that she had settled with the Cojuangcos on the ownership of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. for a staggering P2 billion. Among these loyalists were surprisingly, Cobarrubias, and Gadi. Their gripe? Imelda was, as mentioned by a loyalist, “in a position and has the means to fulfill” her promise of “setting up a Marcos foundation to benefit the poor.”
Gadi was quoted by the Inquirer as saying that Imelda was “in a position to help her loyalists, but I see no sign on her part.” Things were so bad between Imelda and her former “groupies,” as a November 2002 Arab News article called them, that they started calling Imelda a liar, or “a master of acting and deception.” They were still angry at Imelda a year later, with no indication that the incredibly wealthy Antonio Vialogo, who funded Imelda’s 70th birthday bash in 1999, would throw another birthday party for the former first lady again.
Imelda Marcos in exile in the United States with Rita Gadi, from Reynaldo Fajardo’s book The Acquittal, Homecoming, and Inevitable Rise to the Presidency of Imelda Romualdez Marcos
But in the year before Bongbong became a senator, Imelda reconciled with Cobarrubias and company. All of them became the staunchest of Marcos supporters again, and their tell-all anti-Imelda book did not materialize. According to a Rappler report, Oscar Violago, Anthony’s father, contributed P15 million to Imee’s successful senate campaign in 2019. Cobarrubias, during her recent guesting in Gadi’s online program, happily talked about funding the production and publication of the pro-Marcos books of the Katarungan at Katotohanan (Truth and Justice) Foundation, Inc., such as Hubris: When States and Men Dare God – The Persecution of the Marcoses.
For some, money probably does help fuel loyalty to the Marcoses. Marcos “inheritance” or “biyaya/ayuda” scams persist to this day. Some are relatively unsophisticated, such as a recently debunked claim circulating online after the elections that Bongbong was giving aid in exchange for personal information. Others are utterly bizarre, such as at least two recent videos, with hundreds of thousands of views on YouTube alone, claiming that Marcos Sr. is still alive, and that the man himself, and not Bongbong, would bring prosperity to all.
Even Cobarrubias, in conversation with Gadi, said that the former president metaphorically rose from the dead (“bumangon tuloy si Ser”) and campaigned in the last election. Indeed faith, partly disinformation-driven, in a dead man who supposedly gave up his wealth for his people—all evidence to the contrary— is probably also difficult to shake off for many who had already invested so much in the Marcos cause. Millions, scammed or otherwise, are probably ecstatic about the Second Coming of Ferdinand Marcos – Senior or Junior.
They helped put a Marcos back in Malacañang; will the Marcos heirs reward their faith?
Originally published by Vera Files on May 7, 2022.
If surveys on the fast-approaching elections hold, the Philippines will soon have a president who has difficulty discerning fact from pseudoscience — the way his mother also does.
On March 19, 2022, Martin Andanar, acting presidential spokesperson, asked Bongbong Marcos in an interview if he, like his mother, former first lady Imelda, “really believe[s] that there is deuterium in our country.”
This was his full reply:
Ah that, that’s not question, ep . . . people it’s been established that ah . . . especially, kasi ‘yung sa malalim, ah . . . nand’yan ‘yung Marianas Trench sa atin, nand’yan ‘yung sa . . . what—seven kilometers deep. Ah, that, that’s established that it, it belongs there—ah it belongs there—ah that it exists in those places. But it is something na, for, that, that, we will use for a hydrogen-based econ—ah energy economy. Ah . . . it will take time. Eh, for the future siguro p’wede nating tingnan nang mabuti ‘yan. Ito’y kasi ah . . . eh hydrogen is very clean, very green. Ah, ang ang ang ah . . . waste ng ng deuterium, pagka gumawa ka ng hydrogen, ginamit mo ‘yung hydrogen, ginamit mo ginawa mong fuel cell, ang lumalabas dyan, lang dyan is tubig. So walang, walang carbon ah . . . emissions ah . . . kaya’t malinis. But that’s for the future kasi it will require the same infrastructure that we now have for gasoline and for, ah . . . ano, for diesel, and for PNG, and LPG. All of these systems now took, what, over a hundred years to establish. Ah . . . kailangan magrere-adjust tayo. But I think because of the concerns with global warming, du’n ta . . . du’n talaga tayo papunta. At uhm . . . the time will come that we will start to shift to other alternative fuels, the greener fuels, and become a greener economy, we will have a greener system of energy. Nagsimula na, mula nung COP 26 na nagmeeting sa Edinburgh, na ang pinag—, binawasan ‘yung ah . . . pag ah . . . paggamit ng coal. Ang problema walang kapalit na renewable. Kaya tumaas ang presyo bigla. Kaya bumalik na naman ng kaunti dinagdagan na naman ng coal-fired, nga ga, ng kuryente na galing sa coal-fired at ah . . . kaya kailangan talaga natin babalansehin lahat ‘yan. That’s why deuterium is still very attractive ah . . . ah . . . attractive resource . . . ah para sa atin because hydrogen is, has been established, as a clean ah . . . as a clean alternative, a greener alternative to fossil fuels. So, yes, ah . . . ‘yung mother ko talaga malayo mag-ano ‘yan eh, malayo talaga mag-isip ‘yun, she’s very forward-thinking. So that’s, that was her thinking when she ah . . . started to show an interest in the deuterium deposits that have been established around the Philippines.
Bongbong erred when he said that the Marianas Trench is seven kilometers deep (it’s 11.034), that COP 26 was held in Edinburgh (it was in Glasgow), or that the pursuit of a greener economy began with COP 26 (as quite clear in the name, it was the 26th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), and there is no mistaking his admiration for his “very forward-thinking” mother.
The son’s admiration for Imelda’s supposed prescience seemed to equal the intensity of his belief in deuterium. While a senator from 2010 until 2016, Bongbong filed two bills: Senate Bill 2593 on November 15, 2010 and SB 408 on July 3, 2013. These were identical bills for a Hydrogen Research and Development Center. Both died at the committee level.
The bills failed in their primary objective but succeeded in putting into the Senate’s legislative record, through the explanatory notes, this particular claim regarding deuterium: “Hydrogen is being processed from deuterium which is heavy water or hydrogen water without oxygen. This is obtained from the deep trenches of the world and the world’s largest deposit of deuterium is in the Philippines.”
Bongbong, while running for vice president in 2016, referenced SB 2593 in a press release to burnish his credentials as an advocate of alternative energy sources.
Mother and son’s conviction that the country has access to unparalleled deuterium deposits goes against peer-reviewed scientific research. At least one public historian, scientists, and journalists, have used that research to cure those who suffer from what is called “deuterium delirium,” but debunking does not always work in this age of disinformation.
THE SCAM BEGINS
When the first claims on deuterium deposits in the Philippines appeared in local media after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the naturally-occurring hydrogen isotope was touted to be the resource that would solve the country’s economic woes.
At the time, everyone was aware of the enormous debt that the Marcoses burdened the country with before they were deposed. In a series of online articles about the deuterium hoax, the late historian Bob Couttie found an article released in August 1987 by the Media Mindanao News Service.
The article featured a local “scientist,” Cesar Escosa, who believed the “Philippine Deep in Surigao [del] Norte holds the largest deposit of deuterium.” He said this could be mined to “pay all [the country’s] foreign debts,” allow overseas Filipino workers to come home to “higher paying jobs,” and provide the world with an inexhaustible source of fuel. Escosa supposedly claimed that Washington and then president Cory Aquino was discussing the “deuterium project” as early as March 1986.
Escosa’s claims have not been backed by any reliable source.
Before he was declared a nuisance candidate when he tried to run for senator in 2001, Escosa said he was an accountant. He was also declared a nuisance when he filed his certificate of candidacy in the 1998 presidential race.
But there were other deuterium believers, notably in the House of Representatives. In August 1987, Rep. Mario S. Ty of Surigao filed House Resolution No. 98 requesting the “Departments of Environment and Natural Resources and Other Concerned Agencies of the Government to Conduct Feasibility Studies and Surveys to Determine the Presence of Deuterium Off the Coast of Surigao in Aid of Legislation.” In the same month, Glenda Ecleo of Dinagat filed HB 483 establishing the Philippine Deuterium Development Authority. Not to be outdone, Ty filed a similar bill.
Both died at the committee level.
In response to “numerous inquiries,” likely stemming from Escosa’s claims and these legislative filings, the Nonconventional Resources Division (NCRD) of what was then called the Bureau of Energy Development, Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), released a backgrounder entitled “Deuterium Explained” in the April-September 1987 issue of the NCRD newsletter Energy Alternatives.
In fairly accessible language, the NCRD affirmed that deuterium, “in combination with hydrogen, is already a recognized source of energy,” and that hydrogen was at the time “already being used as fuel for rockets and spacecrafts” and was “a feasible alternative to hydrocarbon (oil) fuel.”
But the NCRD cited a number of caveats: deuterium extraction can be done through electrolysis, but the process is expensive; and nuclear fusion, the process through which deuterium can become a “tremendous source of energy,” was (and still is) “very much in the research phase.”
The NCRD also revealed what scientists had determined after the discovery of deuterium in 1931: all water has deuterium.
“Deuterium exists in all types of water such as seawater, river water, ground water, rain and snow,” it said, adding that in water, “there is one deuterium atom for every 6,700 atoms of hydrogen.”
In NCRD’s view, deuterium production was not a bad venture—if very expensive and likely impractical—for the Philippine government to go into, but this should not be done on the belief that there is more deuterium in Philippine waters than anywhere else.
The NCRD made this more explicit in an article titled “OEA Paper Debunks Deuterium Myth” in the October-December 1988 issue of Energy Alternatives. Citing OEA Energy Research Laboratory chief Zalson Espino and Nonconventional Resources Division chief Conrado Huruela, it stated that “scientific facts make it impossible for deuterium deposits to be lodged in the Philippine Deep.”
The article further stated that breaking up deuterium oxide or “heavy water” to obtain deuterium gas “requires electric current [i.e., electrolysis] and cannot be initiated in water simply by high pressure [i.e., at the bottom of the Philippine Deep].”
“Even if, by some natural process, deuterium gas gets isolated from water, its natural tendency would be to rise and escape into the atmosphere [not, say, stay in the ocean depths] because it is much lighter than water,” it continued.
“The claim, therefore, that deuterium can be mined from the Philippine Deep and used to generate electricity is utterly fallacious and without basis,” the piece concluded.
“Oceanographic hallucinations.” That was how Roger Posadas, a PhD in physics and former dean of the College of Science at the University of the Philippines, characterized Escosa’s deuterium claims in a March 15, 1988 report in the Manila Standard. He called Escosa a “pseudo-scienfic swindler.”
Despite all this —and the much-publicized debunking of an alleged breakthrough “cold fusion” experiment involving deuterium conducted by American chemists Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons in 1989 — the scam went on.
In 1989, Tarlac Rep. Herminio Aquino accused Escosa of defrauding some 10,000 applicants in a deuterium mining project. The congressman said that Escosa’s firm charged P5 “for application forms” and P10 for notarization when it had “already been established that there are no deuterium deposits in the Philippines.”
ENTER THE MARCOSES
There is no credible proof that the Marcoses were already attached to deuterium claims while the family patriarch was still president. In the last book attributed to him, A Trilogy on the Transformation of Philippine Society (1988), the dictator very briefly mentioned deuterium as a possible energy resource. In the portion on planned programs, Marcos Sr. said “oil exploitation and other indigenous energy deposits like coal, uranium and deuterium shall also be looked into.”
The deuterium dream was still alive in the early 1990s. A story in the textbook Growing Up Gracefully (Rex Book Store, 1991) partly used the deuterium hoax to illustrate the value of the country’s natural resources. It said that deuterium was “like diesel oil and is used for cooking, lighting, and for transportation.”
“With our big deposit of deuterium,” a character in the story said “the Philippines could be one of the richest countries in the world.”
But by the late 1990s, deuterium was no joke to Imelda. Before withdraing from the 1998 presidential derby, she talked about deuterium as a possible solution to the country’s economic troubles. It is unclear where Imelda picked up this advocacy, but Escosa’s discussion on deuterium in his continued public appearances may have contributed to her “education” on the topic.
According to Couttie, “the deuterium scam was firmly affixed to the Marcoses and Imelda promoted it heavily through amenable media people” by 2004 as Imelda often talked about this in interviews with both local and foreign media.
Over time, Imelda and her allies started to claim that she owned the deuterium deposits or the rights to them.
HYDROSPHERE RESOURCES FOR MOTHERING, INC.
What can be ascertained is that on March 31, 2005, a firm named Hydrosphere Resources for Mothering, Inc. applied for an offshore exploration permit in Davao Oriental. The following day, it also filed an application for a permit for the “exploration and development of gold, copper and other base metal resources” in the town of Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte.
The firm’s address was 204 Mariano Marcos Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan, Metro Manila— the main residence of the former first family before Marcos Sr. became president. The two documents are on display at the Batac World Peace Center/Marcos Photo Gallery, a museum Imelda set up near the Marcos Presidential Center/Mausoleum.
One of Hydrosphere Resources for Mothering, Inc.’s exploration permit applications, displayed at the Batac World Peace Center. Photo by Judith Camille Rosette.Another one of Hydrosphere Resources for Mothering, Inc.’s exploration permit applications, displayed at the Batac World Peace Center. Photo by Judith Camille Rosette.
Both applications were denied, but another one was filed by Hydrosphere on April 5, 2005. This time it was for an exploration permit for “gold, copper, platinum, tungsten, etc.” in Guian, Eastern Samar.” This too was rejected because of the company’s failure to submit by the May 22, 2013 deadline the minimum capital requirements for mining applicants.
In short, Hydrosphere does not currently have any valid mining exploration permits on any of these sites along the Philippine Trench on the country’s Pacific coast.
A map of the Philippines adorns the “Twin Mansion” in Cabuyao, Laguna, one of the Marcos properties sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government but is curiously still sometimes used by the family. Onlinepictures show that the map depicts the Philippines’s GOD — Gold, Oil, Deuterium, with the “D” located the “Phil. Trench, Deepest Part of the World.” Similar imagery can be found in Imelda’s Batac World Peace Center.
In Imelda: Mothering and Her Poetic and Creative Ideas in a Troubled World (2012), which is in many ways a rehash of Imelda’s other book Circles of Life, the former first lady tells the author, Cecilio Arillo, that deuterium is “the strategic energy of the future” and that “some people are already calling the Philippines as ‘God:’ gold, oil and deuterium.”
In a 2013 with Norman Pearlstine of Bloomberg Businessweek, Imelda claimed that she spent “millions of dollars a year to maintain her exclusive right to extract water from [the Philippine Trench] in the hope that having an abundance of deuterium can speed the development of advanced nuclear fusion reactors.”
Imelda’s Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth when she was a member of Congress from 2010 to 2019 does not show any such payments.
The former first lady likewise said she had known about the deuterium deposits as early as the 1970s when Edward Teller, known as the Father of the Hydrogen Bomb, “persuaded her to develop her country’s deuterium in a 1971 visit to the Malacañang Palace.”
The register of Edward Teller Papers in the Hoover Institution Library & Archives in California shows that Teller, who died in 2003, visited the Philippines in 1981 to discuss matters such as nuclear fusion in conferences held in the country.
In later years, Imelda would drop Teller from her deuterium soliloquy and replace him with Harold Urey, “the discoverer of deuterium.” By this time, she claimed that it was Urey, who died in 1981, who informed her of the deuterium deposits in the Philippines.
Imelda, a notoriously unreliable narrator, repeatedly insists that Irving Berlin wrote the song “Heaven Watch the Philippines” specifically for her. The American composer himself denied this, according to a note in the interview of the Marcos couple published in the August 1987 issue of Playboy.
In the documentary The Kingmaker, Imelda says with a straight face that she visited the Calauit Safari Park after she returned from exile in 1991 and was saddened at what it had become. A caretaker interviewed in the documentary flatly denies this.
By 2015 Imelda and her son began doubling down on their deuterium claims.
In a video posted in one of the Facebook pages of the Marcos loyalist group Friends of Imelda Romualdez Marcos (FIRM), Imelda is seen hawking deuterium in, of all places, the wake of one of her most ardent supporters.
“[Mayroon] akong produkto na deuterium,” she says before the mourners that included the husband of the deceased. “Siya and magiging ating pang-gasolina . . . 20 centavos of deuterium is your fuel per month.”
Imelda said she would be meeting someone about deuterium the next day (the wake took place around late April-early May 2015). She added that FIRM would be the “foundation of the mission for mothering world peace” and that they would bring peace on earth using deuterium.
Shortly after, Bongbong, in an interview in the June 29-July 6, 2015 issue of BizNews Asia, said that his “mother had access to deuterium deposits,” which had “bequeathed” to her grandchildren.
Imelda found new partners in deuterium ventures within the last seven years, including one with groups such as the MHLK (M for Maharlika) Foundation and the Official Maharlika Association (OMA) where she is “Chairman – Emeritus.”
A photograph of an OMA board meeting with Imelda at the helm can be seen on its website. In one video of an OMA event held in late 2019—shortly before the pandemic, and about a year after Imelda’s conviction for graft by the Sandiganbayan—she claimed that the “vision” of the deuterium project was “paradise regained unto infinity” and that, contrary to her earlier claims, she had been involved in deuterium, “for several decades, even before [she] was first lady.”
Beside her while she delivered her speech—where she also claimed that she seeded the money that gave birth to Silicon Valley—was businessman Paul Monozca, chairman and CEO of OMA and related firms Formula Green Corporation and Formula Green Foundation. In recent years, Monozca made the news—before actually making the news via OMA’s “affiliate,” Maharlika TV— because of his involvement in the controversial planned Coral World Park in Palawan.
The white paper claims that this cryptocurrency—perhaps closer in description to a toke—is backed up by the “Global Assets and Resources” of the “Maharlika Trust,” “the second largest philanthropic fund in the world,” and the “raw material of fusion and its futures.” These “futures” refer partly to Formula Green’s “concessions of the world’s largest deposit of the raw material of fusion energy called ‘Deuterium’ and stakes in the industry verticals including hydrogen economy.”
OMA is supposed to be a “movement of 10 million followers.” Among its “eight key groups” is the “Talleano Estate (direct heir).” While the Marcoses have repeatedlydenied having ties to the Tallanos and the Tallano gold claim, the tale of the Kingdom of Maharlika ruled by the Tallanos, purported owners of the entire Philippine archipelago, appears on the website of the Marcos-affiliated party Kilusang Bagong Lipunan.
A further online search leads to a central document of the Tallano myth, the alleged Original Certificate of Title of the whole Philippines. An annotation in this “OCT-04”—severaltimes proven fake—shows another connection of the myth to deuterium fakery: purportedly made in 1941, ten years after the discovery of deuterium. The annotation states that “Dr. H. F. Bain, Mining Affair Adviser to the Philippine Commonwealth” found “in the area 75 kilometers Southeast of Mindanao, a large undeterminable volume of Deuterium.”
It appears that practically every major Marcos-related group—from FIRM, which claimed in 2019 to have eight million members to the supposedly 10-million strong OMA— are closely linked to Imelda’s deuterium claims.
The Marcoses are also connected to other groups giving away deuterium share certificates: the Royal Alpha Omega Ring Trading Corporation and Philippine Deuterium Development Management Corporation. In April 2018, then Ilocos Norte governor Imee Marcos attended the birthday of the group’s founding chairman, Mahal na Hari (MNH) Filemon O. Reambonanza.
Even one of Imelda’s closest supporters and founder of Marcos Loyalists for God, Country and People, Serafia “Cherry” Cobarrubias, is listed as a board member of the MHLK Foundation. Yet another staunch Marcos defender, Rita Gadi, in the June 9, 2020 episode of her online program The Rita Gadi Hour, claimed that in the middle of the pandemic, Imelda was “finishing” (“tinatapos na”) the deuterium project which had a permit from the government.
Gadi said Imelda already had the instrument needed to extract deuterium from the Philippine Deep and only needed investments “na kanyang inaayos ngayon.” She repeated Imelda’s line about “paradise regained unto infinity,” and expressed belief that Imelda may be able to finish her deuterium project within that year and then, “maibibigay na niya sa atin sa Pilipinas ‘yang deuterium, the fusion of water and the energy.”
Of course, 2020 came and went, but deuterium from the Philippine Deep remains a pipe dream.
WHAT’S IN IT FOR THE MARCOSES
Peddling the lies about deuterium have served the purpose of the Marcos family which has been clawing their way back into power over the last three decades.
After returning from exile, Imelda seemed to have latched on to Escosa’s deuterium claims. The imagined deuterium riches of the country would effectively undo the two most damaging legacies of the Marcos dictatorship: a plundered economy and a generation of Filipinos sent into a diaspora to earn a living.
From a propaganda point of view, the deuterium hoax has detracted from public discussions the Marcos plunder — that it is permissible to abandon the effort to recover their ill-gotten wealth since deuterium’s promised bounty would replenish what was stolen from the country’s coffers. Imelda said as much in a February 25, 2006 feature on her by The Independent.
“Our problems are temporary. All I am waiting for is for my lawyers to end these cases against me and I will bring about a new economic order,” she declared.
Barely questioned by media and scientists on this, both Imelda and Bongbong continue to use the deuterium hoax in projecting themselves as advocates for a green environment and hope for the country. The promise of bounty —be it the Yamashita treasure, the Tallano gold, or deuterium in the Philippine Trench — calls for the surrender of the people’s trust to the machinations of the Marcoses.